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I. INTRODUCTION
"Life often presents us with a choice of evils, rather than of goods."1
Abortion is one of the most divisive issues to confront the Ameri-
can people. It polarizes political platforms, families and communities.
The Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade2 fell far short of
putting the abortion issue to rest. To the contrary, the cry to either
overturn or uphold Roe v. Wade is an element of the abortion debate
which continues to grow in volume and tension. Rust v. Sullivan3 ad-
ded fuel to a heated controversy.
Rust v. Sullivan has been referred to as "the most important case
of the term."4 The five-justice majority decision upheld Health and
Human Resources regulations that prohibit federally funded family
planning clinics from counseling or referring clients for abortion and
from lobbying for abortion.5 It also upheld regulations requiring any
abortion-related activities be kept physically separate from activities
supported in any part with Title X funds.6 The penalty for noncom-
pliance is the loss of Title X federal funds.7
Rust v. Sullivan touches the fundamental right of freedom of ex-
1. CHARLES CALEB COLTEN, LACON (quoted in DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 103
(1968)).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 111 S. Ct. 1'159 (1991).
4. What Will Be the Impact of Rust V Sullivan?, 77 A.B.A. J. Aug., 1991 at 32.
5. Rust v. Sullivan, 111. S. Ct. at 1772. The Bush Administration on March 20,
1992 announced a modification of the controversial regulations that would allow physi-
cians to give a patient information about abortion. Nurses and counselors are still pre-
cluded from providing abortion information. See, e.g., David G. Savage, US. Modifies
Abortion-Advice Rules for Clinics, L.A. TIMES, March 21, 1992, at Al.
6. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1772. In 1970, Congress enacted the Family
Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat.
1506 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1982)). Title X is the popular name for Sub-
chapter VIII of the Public Health and Welfare laws, and is so designated because it
falls under Title X of Chapter 373 of public law no. 91-572. See also infra notes 43-57
and accompanying text (describing the new Title X regulations).
7. See infra notes 35-75 and accompanying text.
pression and raises questions of privacy, the impact on the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, and the extent to which the government may
promote a particular viewpoint. To those who oppose abortion, Rust
v. Sullivan appeared to be a green light to attack the heart of Roe v.
Wade.8 Those who support free choice believed that the decision
made too large an inroad into Roe v. Wade.9
This note is divided into five parts. Part II traces the legislative
history behind the regulations and summarizes the new regulations.
Part III is a background of the constitutional issues presented by the
Rust v. Sullivan decision, including freedom of speech, unconstitu-
tional conditions, and the right to privacy. Part IV analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision. Finally, Part V looks at the impact of the
decision on the family planning clinics touched by the decision, the
doctors, staff and patients at such clinics, and the impact in the polit-
ical and legislative arenas. Part VI presents a brief conclusion.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Original Title X Regulations
Congress enacted the Family Planning and Services Population Re-
search Actl0 (the Family Planning Act) in 1970 which added Title X
to the Public Health Service Act (the Public Health Act)." Title X
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secre-
tary) to make federal grants to both private nonprofit and public en-
tities that provide family planning services. 12 These services may
include natural family planning methods, infertility services, and ad-
olescent services,' 3 but may not include abortions.14 Section 1008 of
Title X, which is the center of the controversy in Rust V. Sullivan,'5
states that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning."'16 This phrase was interpreted as meaning that no federal
8. Recent legislation in Louisiana is representative of the attack on Roe v. Wade.
See infra notes 383-390 and accompanying text.
9. Both the Senate and House of Representatives passed legislation allowing
abortion counseling and referral at family planning clinics receiving Title X federal
funds. See discussion at infra note 398 and accompanying text.
10. Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(1-7) (1982).
11. Family Planning and Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8 (1982)).
12. The Secretary has the authority "to make grants to and to enter into contracts
with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of
voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and
effective family planning methods and services." 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1990).
13. Id.
14. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. 91-572, § 1008, 84 Stat. 1508 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)) [hereinafter section 1008].
15. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970).
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funds could be earmarked for abortion, but did not preclude other
funds from being used for abortion services.17
Title X was intended to be a comprehensive family planning ser-
vice. The early guidelines recommended that a pregnant woman re-
ceive counseling on all of her options, including abortion.' s These
guidelines were created notwithstanding the express statement of the
section 1008 sponsor "that abortion is not to be encouraged or pro-
moted in any way through [Title X] legislation."'19 Subsequently, be-
tween 1974 and 1987 members of Congress made at least five
attempts to remove abortion counseling from the list of comprehen-
sive services that should be provided to a pregnant woman.20 All of
the legislation either died in committee or was voted down.2 1
Early attempts to remove abortion counseling from Title X pro-
grams contradict that part of the legislative record suggesting a con-
17. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
18. Pre-1981 guidelines covered "abortion related activities that were permissible
within the section 1008 prohibition." 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-01 (1988)(codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 59). The revised guidelines issued in 1981 required that a clinic provide counseling
on abortion, among other options, when a woman with an unintended pregnancy in-
quired about her options. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services Program
Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services 8.6 (1981), available in Ap-
pendix to Petitioners Brief for Writ of Certiorari, Rust v. Sullivan (Nos. 89-1391, 89-
1392). See also Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can
The Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV 401, 405-06 n.21
(1989).
19. 116 CONG. REC. 37,375 (1970) (statement by Rep. Dingell). The only connec-
tion that Rep. Dingell saw between family planning and abortion was that "properly
operated family planning programs should reduce the incidence of abortion." Id. Rep-
resentative Dingell has since repudiated the now often quoted remark that abortion
was not to be promoted or encouraged. C. Andrew McCarthy, The Prohibition on
Abortion Counseling and Referral in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1185 n. 28. In a letter to Secretary Otis Brown, Representative
Dingell stated that his comments were not intended to imply "'that family planning
clinics should be prohibited from counseling pregnant women on any matter or refer-
ring them to appropriate facilities.'" Id. (citing Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell to
HHS Secretary Otis Bowen (Oct. 14, 1987, quoted in Brief for Appellant at app., Massa-
chusetts v. Bowen, 873 F.2d. 1528 (1st Cir. 1989)).
20. 120 CONG. REC. 21,687-95 (1974); 121 CONG. REc. 20,863-65 (1975); 124 CONG.
REC. 37,045 (1978); President's Pro-Life Bill of 1987, S. 1242, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Unborn Children's Civil Rights Act, S. 381, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
Preborn Children's Civil Rights Act of 1987, H.R. 720, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987).
The legislature was more successful with the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-10 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This regulation restricts abortion counsel-
ing or referral for adolescents. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a). See generally, Janet Benshoof,
The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation Of Abortion Information And The First
Amendment, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1916 (1988) (outlining the AFLA and its first amend-
ment applications imd limitations).
21. McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1184-85.
cern that family planning choices be made according to the
conscience of the individual client.22 On the other hand, there is no
dispute that actual abortions could not be performed or actively pro-
moted using Title X funds.23
The original congressional intent as to the application of section
1008 is far from clear.2 4 For the past twenty years the consensus was
that actually performing an abortion was prohibited by section
1008,25 as was anything beyond the "mere referral" to a clinic that
provided abortions.26 The Title X recipient application required the
applicant to state that they would not use Title X funds to "provide
abortions as a method of family planning," and bolstered this inter-
pretation of section 1008.27
In 1982, the General Accounting Office (the GAO) issued a report
recommending that the Secretary clarify the section 1008 restriction
on abortion.28 The GAO based its recommendation on the GAO's
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-5. Members of Congress indicated, for example, that Ti-
tle X should enable "all individuals., within the dictates of their conscience, to exert
control over their own life destinies." 116 CONG. REC. 24092 (1970). There was also an
expressed concern that the religious beliefs of the individual be protected. 116 CONG.
REc. 37388 (1970) ("[wle must be very careful to safeguard the religious and moral con-
victions of all our citizens").
23. See Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel Dept. of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (April 14, 1978) available in Joint Appendix of Petitioners Brief at 54
(Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392). This memorandum states that "the provision of information
concerning abortion services [and] mere referral of an individual to another provider
of services for an abortion ... are not considered proscribed by [section] 1008." Id.
24. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-01. See Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991).
25. See e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 405 (2nd Cir. 1989) vacated by
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991)(stating that "administrative interpretations at
first permitted, and later required, Title X projects to provide information about, and
referral for, abortions, including names and addresses of "abortion clinics"), citing U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PROGRAM INCENTIVES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES (Jan. 1976); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6
(1981)). A statement in the conference report accompanying the regulation seems to
bear out this intent.
It is, and has been, the intent of both Houses that the funds authorized under
this legislation be used only to support preventive family services, population
research, infertility services, and other related medical, information and edu-
cation activities. The conferees have adopted the language contained in sec-
tion 1008, which prohibits the use of such funds for abortion in order to make
clear this intent.
CONF. REP. No. 91-1667, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8-9 (1970)(emphasis added). But see the
comments made by Representative Dingell supra note 19.
26. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 405. For instance, activities that "promote or
encourage" abortion were proscribed by section 1008, including encouraging abortion
or providing transportation for an abortion. Memorandum from Carol C. Conrad, Of-
fice of the General Counsel, Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, to Elsie Sullivan, Ass't
for Information and Education, Office of Family Planning (April 14, 1978), quoted in
Brief for the Respondent at 41 n. 46 and see 33-34 n. 37 (nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
27. 36 Fed. Reg. 18,465, 18,466 (1971) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (a)(9) (1972)).
28. Comp. Gen. Rep. No. GAO/HRD-82-106, Restrictions on Abortion and Lobby-
ing Activities in Family Planning Programs Need Clarification p. 22 (1982), attached
[Vol. 19: 637, 1992] Rust v. Sullivan
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findings that Title X family planning clinics were confused about the
boundaries of the abortion ban.29 The GAO reviewed fourteen clinics
and found that some clinics provided brochures published by abortion
clinics,30 or only provided abortion counseling if the patient indicated
she desired to terminate her pregnancy,31 or routinely provided in-
formation on abortion as a birth control option.3 2 In spite of the
GAO's report and recommendation, HHS Secretary Heckler stated at
a 1984 House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee hearing that
there was general compliance with the section 1008 abortion ban.33
As late as 1985, the House Energy and Commerce Committee de-
clined to reinforce the language of section 1008 and affirmed the orig-
inal conference committee report providing that section 1008 was not
intended to interfere with abortion-related services not funded by Ti-
tle X.34
In this atmosphere of mixed signals, President Reagan announced
that the Public Health Service proposed to change Title X regula-
tions in order to ensure compliance with section 1008 barring the use
of Title X funds for abortions.3 5
B. The New Regulations
In early 1988, the Department of Health and Human Services
promulgated new regulations3 6 that strengthened the anti-abortion
to Joint Appendix at 82, Rust v. Sullivan (nos. 89-1391, 89-1392). The Office of the In-
spector General (OIG) issued a similar report based on their audit of thirty-two clinics.
53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988). The OIG found that the clinics had varying procedures and
were confused about which activities were prohibited by section 1008. Id
29. The GAO audited fourteen clinics and found various levels of abuse of the De-
partment of Health and Human Service's (HHS) interpretation of section 1008. GAO
Report at 14-15. HHS interpreted section 1008 to preclude abortion and any activity
that would promote or encourage abortion. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-01 (1988).
30. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, n.7 (1988). The GAO also objected to the patients using the
clinic telephone to make appointments with an abortion clinic. Id One clinic was
found to make loans to the patients with nonprogram funds. Id The administrative
costs associated with the unapproved activities were incorporated into Title X program
costs. Id
31. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, n.6 (1988).
32. Id at n.8.
33. Reauthorization of Title; Family Planning Program: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1984) (Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary HHS stated that title
X clinics "have honored the law in terms of the abortion prohibition").
34. H.R. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1985), (quoting H. R. CONF. REP.
No. 91-1667 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 8-9 (1970)0.
35. 52 Fed. Reg. 33,210-01 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59).
36. Amendments of Subpart A of Part 59, 53 Fed. Reg. 2944-46 (1988) (codified at
42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2-59.10 (1988)).
provision of Title X of the Public Health Service Act.37 HHS ex-
pressed several reasons for the changes. The department stated that
clinic practice had strayed from the program intended by Congress,
and the changes were necessary to clarify the abortion prohibition
and "administer [Title X] as provided by Congress."3 8 HHS referred
to public comments received in response to the proposed regulations
in order to support its proposition that "nondirective counseling"3 9
was misguided and resulted in uninformed choices leading to
abortion.40
Under the old regulations a Title X clinic could counsel and refer a
woman for abortion.41 The new regulations eliminated those options
in order to "enable individuals to determine the number and spacing
of their children, while clarifying that pregnant women must be re-
ferred to appropriate prenatal care services."42 To receive federal
funds under Title X, the clinic must prove compliance with all the
new regulations. 43 The regulations, as summarized, mandate that:
(1) A clinic cannot "provide counseling concerning the use of abor-
tion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion
as a method of family planning."44 Counselling encompasses any
brochures or films that include information on abortion.45 This sub-
section acquired the tag of "the gag rule."4 6
(2) A client who is diagnosed as pregnant must be referred to a
provider that "promote[s] the welfare of mother and unborn child."47
The client may be referred to an emergency care provider if an emer-
gency exists.48
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300(a)-7 (1982).
38. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988). The HHS's proposed rules relied heavily on Repre-
sentative Dingell's 1970 statements on the House floor. 52 Fed. Reg. 33210-01 (1987).
But see supra note 19.
39. Non-directive counseling involves advising a woman of her options without
counseling her specifically to have an abortion. The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (PBS
television broadcast, May. 28, 1991 (Transcript #4042)) (comments by Karrie Galloway,
Family Planning Clinic Director), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
40. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988). Comments received by the Department stated that
there was no "balanced discussion" of the woman's option, and women were pressured
into abortion. Id. "These commentators typically stated that they had experienced se-
vere and long-lasting regret over the decision to abort, and also stated that they were
given no counseling at the time they made their decision to abort as to the remorse
and guilt they might later feel." Id.
41. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
42. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988) (citing H. REP. No. 9101472, 91st CoNG., 2nd Sess
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C. Cong. Admin. News 5071.
43. 42 C.F.R. § 59.7.
44. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (a)(1).
45. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922.
46. See, e.g. Chervin, supra note 18.
47. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2).
48. Id HHS provides the example of a woman who is diagnosed with an ectopic
pregnancy, and states that referral for emergency medical care would comply with the
regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(1).
[Vol. 19: 637, 1992] Rust v. Sullivan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
(3) A clinic cannot weight a referral list in favor of health care
providers who perform abortions, or include health care providers
whose "principal business" is abortions.49
(4) A clinic may provide comprehensive information about contra-
ception methods, but may not include information about abortion.50
(5) A clinic must be "physically and financially separate" from
prohibited activities.5 1 Any abortion related service must be done by
separate personnel, in a separate facility with separate funds. Com-
pliance is determined on a case by case basis.52
(6) A Title X recipient cannot "encourage, promote or advocate
abortion as a method of family planning."53 Prohibited activities
include:
(a) Lobbying for legislation that would increase the availa-
bility of abortion.5 4
(b) "Providing speakers to promote... abortion."55
(c) Paying dues to a group that supports abortion.5 6
49. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(3). A Title X project violates the regulations if the list in-
cludes a single clinic which "principally provides abortions." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(3). A
clinic violates the regulations if the list provided fails to include appropriate providers
who do not perform or refer for abortions. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(4).
50. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(4). A Title X project would not violate the statute if a cli-
ent was provided a manufacturer's brochure that compared the relative safety of con-
traception methods and included information about abortion. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(6).
51. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9.
52. Id. The factors that the Secretary uses to determine compliance include:
(a) The existence of separate accounting records;
(b) The degree of separation from facilities (e.g., treatment, consultation, ex-
amination and waiting rooms) in which prohibited activities occur and the ex-
tent of such prohibited activities;
(c) The existence of separate personnel;
(d) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification of the Title X
projects are present and signs and material promoting abortion are absent.
Id,
53. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a). Providing brochures that advertise an abortion clinic vio-
lates this subsection. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b)(1). Making an appointment for a client with
a clinic that performs abortions is a violation. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b)(2).
54. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)(1). A Title X project would not be in violation of this sec-
tion if an employee individually writes his or her legislator to gain further expansion
of "the legal availability of abortion." 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b)(6). There is no violation if a
Title X project is owned by an organization that lobbies for abortion, but the clinic it-
self is prohibited from lobbying and no project funds may be used. 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.10(b)(5).
55. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)(2). There may be no violation if an employee of a Title X
project speaks at his or her own expense. The example given specifies that the em-
ployee speak before a "legislative body," however, that same premise should carry over
to any speech in support of abortion as long as no Title X funds are used in the en-
deavor. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b)(7).
56. 42 C.F.R. 59.10(a)(3). Paying dues to an entity that, "among other activities,
(d) Using legal means to increase the availability of
abortion.57
(e) Preparing or distributing written, audiovisual or other
material promoting abortion.58
In addition, HHS provided new definitions of key terms that are
important in understanding the expansiveness of the ban on abortion
counseling and referral. First, "project funds" are no longer limited
to federal funds and include "grant-related income or matching
funds."59 This sweeps virtually all of a clinic's funding into the net of
"project funds."60 Thus, spending funds from a state or local source
on a forbidden activity would jeopardize a Title X project's continued
receipt of federal funds.61 Second, "family planning" is defined to en-
compass only preconception services to "limit or enhance fertility."62
Specifically, "[flamily planning does not include pregnancy care ...
[or] abortion."6 3 Consequently, once a Title X client is diagnosed as
pregnant, she must be referred to another facility for prenatal care.64
The referral itself is governed by the criteria set out in the regula-
tions, and cannot include an abortion referral.65
The Secretary intended to create "a wall of separation between Ti-
tle X programs and abortion as a method of family planning."66 The
new regulations succeed in codifying the view that "abortion is inap-
propriate as a method of family planning."67 HHS suggests that the
new regulations reflect the Department's original and consistent in-
terpretation of section 1008 prohibiting the use of project funds for
abortions.68 Admittedly, HHS failed to successfully inform the Title
lobbies... to protect or expand the legal availability of abortion" is a violation of this
subsection. 42 C.F.F. 59.10(b)(3). But if the Title X project is operated by an associa-
tion that pays dues to the same organization, then there is no violation as long as Title
X funds are not used and the clinic is not directly involved. 42 C.F.F. 59.10(b)(4).
57. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)(4). The regulations give no specific examples of a violation
of this section. However, the subsection operates as a catchall for any activity, includ-
ing instituting a law suit that would advocate abortion.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)(5).
59. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2.
60. McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1186. "[A]ll of a clinic's funds, whatever their
source, are brought within the regulations." Id
61. Id.
62. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2.
63. Id. "'Family planning' means the process of establishing objectives for the
number and spacing of one's children and selecting the means by which those objec-
tives may be achieved." Id. Services may be provided for contraceptive methods and
infertility-including adoption, counseling, education and diagnosis--and treatment of
"infections which threaten reproductive capability." Id
64. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (stating "[b]ecause Title X funds are intended only for
family planning, once a client served by a Title X project is diagnosed as pregnant, she
must be referred for appropriate prenatal and/or social service.").
65. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
66. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988).
67. Id.
68. Id. The fact that HHS issued guidelines in 1981 that mandated nondirective
[Vol. 19: 637, 1992] Rust v. Sullivan
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X fund recipients about the extent of the section 1008 ban.69
Title X has a tremendous impact on family planning in the United
States.70 Approximately 4,000 clinics receive up to $200 million annu-
ally in federal funds to administer family planning services.71 These
clinics provide services to approximately 4.3 million women, the ma-
jority of whom are well below the poverty line.72
Proponents of the old, pre-1988 regulations suggest that family
planning services offered by Title X programs have successfully re-
duced the incidence of unwanted pregnancies.73 Proponents of the
new regulations believe that under the old rules, Title X programs
were guilty of at least indirectly causing abortions,74 and opine that
the new regulations will correct this misapplication of Title X
funds.7s
abortion counseling is at odds with the implication that HHS had always meant the
section 1008 ban to encompass more that just the act of abortion. See supra notes 17-
22. 69. See Gen. Acct. Office, Restrictions on Abortion and Lobbying Activities in
Family Programs Need Clarification (Sept. 24, 1982), attached to Joint Appendix at 82,
Rust v. Sullivan (nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
70. See e.g., Courts Cruel Legacy, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1991 (Editorials), at 1 (stat-
ing that 83% of clients receive no other prenatal care). See also Fiscal Ethical Choices
Face Counselors, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1991 (Metro), at 26 (advising that federal
funds provide $600,000 annually for 1/3 of a Massachusettes family planning clinic).
71. See An Anti-Abortion Portent, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1991 (Editorials), at 14.
For a different estimate see McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1183 (4,000 family planning
clinics received $140 million).
72. Abortion Rulings Dual Dangers, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1991, at C29; Peter Bran-
don Bayer, Court's Disturbing Abortion Decision, S. F. CHRON., May 25, 1991 (Open
Forum), at A18. See also Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899
F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that an estimated 90% of Title X clients have in-
comes 150% below the poverty line.)
73. 136 CONG. REC. S13930 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (stat-
ing "for every dollar spent in family planning, we save $2 in the following year in
health and welfare costs associated with unintended births"). Contra Philip Elmer-De-
Witt, Why Isn't Our Birth Control Better, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 52, 53 (asserting that
American women are "grossly misinformed" about birth control).
74. See Dr. William Archer, Remarks at the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus News
Briefing (May 31, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (stating that
Planned Parenthood conducted one million abortions and referred women elsewhere
for another one million abortions).
75. 52 Fed. Reg. 33,210-01 (1990) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59). The summary states:
The Public Health Service (PHS) proposes to amend the regulations gov-
erning the use of funds for family planning service under Title X of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act in order to set specific standards for compliance with
the statutory requirement that none of the funds appropriated under Title X
may be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. This
change is being proposed to bring the compliance requirements for programs
using Title X funds into conformity with the statutory ban on such use of Ti-
tle X appropriated funds. The proposed amendments should improve compli-
It is entirely unclear whether the legislature meant to include
abortion counseling and referral in the section 1008 ban.7 6
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN RUST V. SULLIVAN
A. First Amendment - The Right to Freedom of Speech
[M]en have realized ... that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas... the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and ... truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution. 7 7
The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law
* .. abridging the freedom of speech. s78  First Amendment issues
often arise when an individual's right to freedom of speech conflicts
with government's desire to regulate speech in order to promote
some public good.79 Title X Regulations and the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Rust v. Sullivan create just such a tension.80
ance by grantees with the statute and facilitate monitoring of compliance by
PHS.
Id.
76. Courts that addressed the issue of congressional intent since the new regula-
tions were promulgated agree that the legislative intent is murky. See, e.g., Massachu-
setts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that Congress did not address
the scope of section 1008, and the legislative history could support either side's inter-
pretation); Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting
that the legislative history did not indicate whether referral and counseling was in-
cluded in the abortion ban).
77. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Bran-
deis, J., dissenting), quoted in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
785-86 (2d ed. 1988).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The full text of the first amendment states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." Thus, a number of rights are grouped under the category of freedom of ex-
pression. These include freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
freedom of petition, and freedom of association.
79. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The Konigsberg Court re-
viewed the issue of whether a state bar applicant could refuse to answer questions hav-
ing a substantial relevance to his or her qualifications. This allowed a state to deny a
license to an applicant who refused to answer questions about his or her involvement
with the Communist party, even though membership in the Communist party would
not in itself have provided grounds to deny the license. The Konigsberg Court stated:
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... as protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 'absolutes'.... [G]eneral regu-
latory statutes .. .have not been regarded as the type of law the First or
Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress ... to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite
to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the govern-
mental interest involved.
Id. at 49-51.
80. The majority in Rust v. Sullivan, stated that change in the regulations was jus-
tified in part by the change in the public "attitude against the 'elimination of unborn
children by abortion.'" 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991).
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Not all forms of speech are equally protected. Additionally, certain
established categories of speech are deemed not protected by the
First Amendment.S1 For instance, the Court has found little value in
fighting words,82 or words that in themselves inflict injury,83 or
words that incite violent or illegal conduct,8 4 or even in some com-
mercial speech.8 5 However, the restriction against abortion counsel-
ing in Rust v. Sullivan does not fall neatly into a predefined area of
unprotected speech. Thus, the Secretary must show sufficient justifi-
cation of the restriction in order to withstand a constitutional
challenge.8 6
1. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Analysis
Generally, "government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."8 7
The constitutionality of a statute restricting expression turns on the
81. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1983). Presumably the first amendment protects all communi-
cation. This presumption is rebutted by finding that "a particular class of speech does
not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of the first amendment." Id. Those
classes of speech then become unprotected. Generally, the Court will classify a cate-
gory of speech as unprotected if the speech has "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas [and it is] of . .. slight social value as a step to truth. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
82. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In 0haplinsky the Court
held that certain categories of speech were not speech as meant in the first amend-
ment. The issue in Chaplinsky centered on words that could "incite an immediate
breach of the peace." Id. at 571-72.
83. Id.
84. Words that incite violence are associated with the "clear and present danger"
doctrine that was first set out by Justice Holmes in Scheneck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). Justice Holmes explained that "[t]he question in every case is whether the
words used are used in circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Id. at 52.
85. Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating that commercial
speech is afforded. limited constitutional protection).
86. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that a content-based restriction
is subject to "exacting scrutiny"). See generally TRIBE supra note 76, at 789-794.
If a government regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of an act,
... a regulation is unconstitutional unless government shows that the message
being suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,' constitutes a defamatory
falsehood, or otherwise falls on the unprotected side of one of the lines the
Court has drawn to distinguish those expressive acts privileged by the first
amendment from those open to government regulation with only minimal due
process scrutiny.
Id. at 791-92.
87. Police Dep't. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (invali-
dating an ordinance banning picketing in front of a school).
question of whether it is "content-based" or "content-neutral"88 and
the result of the ensuing analysis. Content-based restrictions are
aimed at the message itself.8 9 For example, a law directed at banning
obscenity constitutes a content-based restriction.90 A law is content-
based if its purpose is to restrict the expression or restrict the impact
of the expression. 91
On the other hand, "content-neutral restrictions limit communica-
tion without regard to the message conveyed." 92 For instance, a law
banning noisy picketing in the immediate vicinity of a school,93 and a
law banning the distribution of handbills to control litter94 would be
content-neutral. Content-neutral restrictions are generally broader
than content-based restrictions.
Content-based restrictions are presumed to be antithetical to the
First Amendment.95 However, if the class of speech is unprotected,
then the level of protection afforded the regulated speech lessens.96
To date the Supreme Court has not classified speech about abortion
as unprotected.
The particular speech cannot be restricted because of fear of peo-
ple's reactions to the speaker's words.97 The Court traditionally ap-
plies a strict scrutiny analysis to a content-based restriction
challenge.98 The Court will look at the motive behind the regulation,
88. Stone, supra note 81, at 195-96.
89. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 790; Stone, supra note 81, at 190.
90. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding ob-
scene material unprotected); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-24 (1973) (same).
91. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restriction, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 (1987)
[hereinafter Content-Neutral Restriction]. Content-based restrictions include laws
aimed at seditious libel or protecting publication of secret information. Id. See also
TRIBE, supra note 77, at 789. Professor Tribe indicates that a content-based restriction
is easy to spot. It is a law that "on its face ... is targeted at ideas or information that
government seeks to suppress, or.. was motivated by ... an intent to single out consti-
tutionally protected speech for control or penalty." Id. at 794. (emphasis in original).
92. Stone, supra note 81, at 189. See also JOHN HART ELY, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analy-
sis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
Professor Tribe describes content-neutral restrictions as those "aimed at noncom-
municative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on communicative opportu-
nity." TRIBE, supra note 77, at 790 (emphasis omitted).
93. Gaynard v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding such a ban).
94. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 791 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147(1939).
95. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 790. See also Stone, supra note 81, at 196 n.28 (ex-
plaining that the Court uses a standard approaching "absolute protection").
96. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
97. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 111 (1980). The Court has held
that a regulation cannot be justified because of the concern that "the audience may
find the ... message persuasive." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 581 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding unconstitutional a
state utility commission order barring public utilities from promoting the use of elec-
tricity through advertisement).
98. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating a statute barring information on drug prices);
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because "when [a] regulation is based on the content of speech, gov-
ernmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that
communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public offi-
cials disapprove the speaker's views.' "99 This strict scrutiny analysis
commonly results in the regulation being found unconstitutional.100
Content-neutral restrictions receive a less severe balancing ap-
proach.101 To determine if the law complies with the First Amend-
ment, the Court considers the extent of the limitation, the extent of
the governmental interests in the restriction, and whether the same
governmental interests can be realized through a less restrictive
means.102 If the governmental interest is high and the limitation on
expression leaves other avenues open for communication, then the
Court defers to the regulation without requiring the government to
use less restrictive means. 0 3 Content-neutral restrictions are ana-
lyzed on a case by case basis by balancing the right of freedom of
speech and the government's interests in restricting speech.104
The speech restriction imposed by the new regulations does not
universally inhibit speech about abortion. Instead, the ban on abor-
tion counseling and referral at Title X family planning clinics prohib-
its speech about abortion within certain circumstances.105 The
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the dis-
play of a red flag in symbolic opposition to government).
99. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951).
100. "ITihe Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has
considered in the past quarter-century." Stone, supra note 81, at 196. See, e.g., FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (stating that all content-based restric-
tions are subject to close judicial scrutiny).
101. Stone, supra note 81, at 190.
102. Id. See e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) reh'g denied, 393 U.S.
900 (1968). The Court upheld a statute banning the burning of a draft card. The Court
reasoned that O'Brien still had viable means to protest the war and deliver a public
message, and that the government had a rationally substantial interest in prohibiting
the act. Id. at 377.
103. Compare United State Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (upholding a law against placing unstamped mailable material in
post office mail boxes, on the ground that the civic association had other adequate
means to distribute its material); and Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (validating a law barring distribution of material
at a state fair from anywhere except a licensed booth, on the ground that the group
had ample opportunity to espouse their views) with Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.147, 162
(1939) (invalidating an ordinance banning public distribution of handbills on the
ground that clean streets was an insufficient reason).
104. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 792.
105. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for discussion of the regulations.
penalty for disobeying the ban is forfeiture of federal funds.106
2. Unconstitutional Conditions and Viewpoint Discrimination
Viewpoint discrimination generally penalizes a particular idea or
speech, while leaving related ideas or speech unfettered10 7 This lop-
sided restriction results in one idea being obscured, while another,
usually opposing, idea is promoted.'0 8 A law that creates such a re-
sult offends the First Amendment because "a law that substantially
restricts the expression of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of in-
formation ... effectively prevents individuals from expressing their
views."109
There is general disagreement about the extent that viewpoints are
or should be protected by the First Amendment.11o However, the
Court has generally found unconstitutional legislation that hinders
the voice of certain ideas.ll For instance, the Court overturned the
suspension of two students who wore black armbands in protest of
the Vietnam war, noting that the school allowed other forms of polit-
ical expression.112 Nevertheless, the Court has suggested that view-
point discrimination may be constitutional where "there is an
appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differen-
tial treatment.""l 3 What should be construed as "suitable" has yet to
be precisely defined.114 However, by upholding the Secretary's inter-
106. See discussion supra at note 43 and accompanying text.
107. McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1197.
108. Stone, supra note 81, at 198.
109. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960). For examples of
such laws see, e.g., The Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217 (prohibiting critical com-
ments about the war and draft); and The Smith Act, Ch. 438, 54 Stat. 670, 671, codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1946)) (prohibiting advocating the violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment).
See also, Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68
VA. L. REv. 203, 207-08 (1982) (explaining that "'the central meaning of the First
Amendment' lies in its protection of debate of public issues" (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964))).
110. Stephan, supra note 109 offers a comprehensive discussion of the different
viewpoints. While there is general consensus that political speech is protected, the
same consensus does not exist for nonpolitical speech. Id. at 209. However, one group
would protect any expression that "enhance[s] the electorate's 'capacity for sane and
objective judgment.'" Id. (quoting Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment', 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221).
111. Stephan, supra note 109, at 209-11.
112. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 396 U.S. 503 (1969). See
also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (invalidating a state law that allowed
church services in a public park, but prohibiting religious meetings in the same park in
an effort to ban a Jehovah's Witness meeting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(where the Court struck down a law that allowed labor organizations to block the
streets to espouse a view, but denied the same privilege to other groups). Justice Black
stated that "if the streets of a town are open to some views, they must be open to all."
Id. at 580 (Black, J. concurring).
113. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
114. Three cases are good examples of the Court's position. FCC v. League of Wo-
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pretation of the ban on abortion counseling and referral in Title X,
the "suitable" boundary has expanded to at least include the govern-
ment's advocation of child birth over abortion,115 thus supporting the
view that the government has the right to articulate its views on the
propriety of abortion in publicly funded programs,11 6 even at the ex-
pense of suppressing another view.
The Title X regulations and the decision in Rust v. Sullivan raise
the issue of viewpoint discrimination in the context of conditional
federal funding.117 Outside of the abortion realm, the Supreme
Court has taken the position that a condition was unconstitutional if
it affected an individual right.118
No clear delineation exists as to the boundaries of the legislature's
ability to impose conditions upon the recipients of federal funds-
conditions that could not otherwise be invoked.119 The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions embraces the idea that "government may
men Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) involved a ban on editorials by publicly funded radio
stations. The Court struck down the ban on the ground of viewpoint discrimination
explaining that the government could not purchase first amendment rights through its
subsidy of a station. Id. at 390-91.
Arkansas Writer's Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1987) stated that a dis-
criminatory tax scheme on certain magazines violated the first amendment.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1963), the Court upheld a
law that prohibited a tax deduction if a charitable contribution was made to a non-
profit organization that engaged in lobbying. The law forbade all lobbying, not just
that which was aimed at a particular viewpoint. The Court stated that "It]he case
would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such
a way as to [aim] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.' " Id. at 548 (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
115. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766, 1774.
116. Theodore C. Hirt, Why The Government Is Not Required To Subsidize Abor-
tion Counseling And Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1904 (1988).
117. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759.
118. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a requirement
that veterans take a loyalty oath as a condition of receiving the veteran's property tax
exemption). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (overruling a statute
that denied welfare benefits to new residents); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(overturning the denial of state unemployment benefits to an employee who would not
work on Saturday for religious reasons).
119. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (1987). See e.g., John 0. French, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L. J. 234 (1961); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935).
Professor Kreimer states that "the distinction between liberty-expanding offers and
liberty-reducing threats turns on the establishment of an acceptable baseline against
which to measure a person's position after imposition of an allocation." Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocation Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352 (1984).
not do indirectly what it may not do directly."'120 An unconstitu-
tional condition is created when the government conditions the re-
ceipt of a benefit on forfeiture of a constitutional right, a right such
as the freedom of speech.121 The benefit involved is always discre-
tionary-a benefit the government is not compelled to provide.' 22
A condition becomes unconstitutional when it is overly coercive. 123
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no compulsion where
only five percent of a project's funds are in jeopardy. 2 4 Further, the
Court has decided that non-subsidies do not fall into the same quag-
mire as coercion. 125 On two occasions, the Court upheld laws that
precluded state or federal subsidies for abortion.126 However, until
Rust V Sullivan, the Court did not allow a conditional use of federal
funds if the condition also "impair[ed] the recipients's use of its own
money."'127 With the sweeping definition of "program funds" in the
new regulations, a family planning clinic may lose its federal subsidy
if the facility uses any program related funds to counsel or refer for
abortions.128
120. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, And the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 7 (1988) (stating "in the context of individual rights, the doctrine provides that
on at least some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has no constitutional
entitlement does not justify making that person abandon some right guaranteed under
the Constitution").
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not without its foes. It has been chal-
lenged as "logically incoherent and corrosive of sovereign power." Epstein at 10. Jus-
tice Holmes addressed the issue by stating:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The ser-
vant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are of-
fered him.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 229, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892)
quoted in Epstein at 10 n.14.
121. McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1195.
122. Sullivan, supra note 120, at 1422-23. "If government must provide a benefit un-
conditionally, it may not offer that benefit conditionally regardless of the content of
the condition." Id. at 1423.
123. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). In Dole, the Supreme Court upheld conditioning the
receipt of federal highway funds on states raising the drinking age to twenty-one. The
Court found that the condition was not coercive because a state who wished to main-
tain a lower drinking age would only loose a small portion - approximately five per-
cent - of federal funds. Id.
124. See id. at 211, and discussion supra at note 122.
125. The Court has held that withholding subsidies for abortion procedures does
not coerce a woman into choosing childbirth, and has allowed such laws to stand. See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
126. See infra notes 129-151 and accompanying text.
127. Sullivan, supra note 120, at 1468.
128. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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B. Federal Funding and Abortion
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the
full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not
of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her
indigency. 1
29
Even prior to Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court unequivocally
established that the government could discourage abortion through
its funding programs,13 0 and promote the public policy decision that
childbirth is preferred over abortion.'13
1. Maher v. Roe
In Maher v. Roe, two indigent women challenged a Connecticut
regulation prohibiting Medicaid funding of nontherapeutic abor-
tions.132 The Court began with the premise that the state was not ob-
ligated to pay for any "pregnancy-related medical expenses of
indigent women."133 But, once the state elected to provide some
medical care, then its allocation of funds was limited by the
Constitution. 3 4
The appellees questioned whether treating medical expenses inci-
dent to childbirth differently from medical expenses incident to abor-
tion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 5 The Court averred that a woman has no constitu-
tional right to an abortion, but only the freedom to choose an abor-
tion, and that the Connecticut regulations did not infringe upon the
freedom of choice.136 Further, the Maher Court stated that there was
129. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
130. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). See generally Susan Fre-
lich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the
Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the We~fare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981).
131. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
132. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466-67.
Professor Epstein suggests that the state's "lesser power" is to exclude abortions
from Medicaid funding, and the state's "greater power is ... [to] decide to have no
Medicaid program at all." Epstein, supra note 120, at 90.
133. Maher, 432 U.S. at 469.
134. Id
135. Id The Equal Protection Clause states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
"no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by
the allocation of public funds."i 37
The Court reasoned that the State's nonfunding of abortions did
not create any additional barriers to an indigent woman's ability to
obtain an abortion.
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult
- and in some cases, perhaps, impossible - for some women to have abor-
tions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
regulation.
13 8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall expressed the "fear 'that
the Court's decisions will be an invitation to public officials, already
under extraordinary pressure from well-financed and carefully
orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more such restrictions'
on governmental funding for abortion."'139 That fear came to fruition
in Harris v. McRae.140
2. Harris v. McRae
The result of the Court's decision in Harris v. McRae, was ratifica-
tion of the Hyde Amendment,141 which denied the use of public
funds for even medically necessary abortions.14 2 The divided
Court 43 continued its line of thought, which germinated in Maher v.
Roe,144 and affirmed that Congress has no obligation to remove an
obstacle, such as poverty, in order to allow a woman to obtain an
137. Id. at 474. See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding that title XIX
of the Social Security Act did not require nor preclude the funding of nontherapeutic
abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (stating that publicly owned hospi-
tals did not have to offer free abortions to the indigent even though the hospital pro-
vided free childbirth procedures).
138. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
139. Id at 481 (Marshall, J. dissenting.)
140. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
141. The Hyde Amendment refers to the funding restrictions passed by Congress,
by amendment, to the annual appropriations bills for the Medicaid program. Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343 codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et.
seq. (1976)).
142. The Hyde Amendment that was applicable when challenged by Harris v. Mc-
Rae stated:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fe-
tus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for
the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.
Pub. L. No. 96-123 § 109, 93 Stat. 926.
143. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan wrote the dissent, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
144. See supra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
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abortion.145 However, Congress could not create new obstacles. 146
While the majority opinion reaffirmed Congress' ability to promote
childbirth through allocation of funds,147 the dissenters would have
found the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional because of its "coercive
impact."'148 The majority reasoned that abortion was the only medi-
cal procedure to involve the "purposeful termination of a potential
life," and must be analyzed differently.149 The Harris decision vali-
dated existing state statutes that limited or proscribed public funding
of abortion and allowed other states to enact such legislation.150 Re-
lying on Maher, the majority concluded that an indigent woman was
145. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
146. Id. The majority reiterated the language and reasoning from Maher v. Roe. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he Hyde Amendment's denial
of public funds for medically necessary abortions plainly intrudes upon th[e] constitu-
tionally protected decision" established in Roe v. Wade: a woman has a "a right to be
free from state interference with her choice to have an abortion." Id. at 330 (Brennan,
J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. and Blackmun, J.).
147. Id. at 315-19.
148. Id. at 330 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Antipathy to abortion ... has been
permitted not only to ride roughshod over a woman's constitutional right to terminate
her pregnancy in the fashion she chooses, but also to distort our Nation's health-care
programs. As a means of delivering health services, then, the Hyde Amendment is
completely irrational." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)
149. Id at 325.
150. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-15-104.5 (1990) (no public funds for induced abor-
tion); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5005 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (no public funds for the
purpose of abortions); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3-3 (West 1984) (no public funds for
abortion unless mother's life is endangered); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (no public funds for abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.34.5
(West 1991) (no public funds unless abortion necessary to save mother's life); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.109(a) (West 1991) (no public funds unless abortion necessary
to save mother's life); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.28 (1991) (state funds shall not be used
for abortion); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.205 (Vernon 1991) (no public funds for abortion
unless to save life of mother); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1615.01 (1990) (no funds for abor-
tions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (no state medical assistance payments
for abortions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-474.3 (1990) (no public funds shall be used to as-
sist in performance of an abortion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.55 (Anderson 1989)
(no state or local funds to subsidize an abortion unless life is endangered); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFEr CODE ANN. § 32.005 (West 1991)(public funds may not be used for
abortion services unless the mother's life is in danger); UT. CODE ANN. § 76-7-323
(1981) (no public funds for abortion or contraceptive services for an unmarried minor);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1978) (no public funds for abortions); 62 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN § 453 (1990) (no public funds for abortion unless mother's life is in
danger); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-92.1 (Michie 1982) (allowing public funds for abortions
resulting from rape or incest); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.04 (1991) (proscribes any public
funds for nontherapeutic abortions); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 20.927 (1986) (same); P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29 § 683 (1989)(no social security payments for abortions),
For a further discussion of state limitations on abortion funding see B. J. George, Jr.,
State Legislatures Versus The Supreme Court. Abortion Legislation in the 1980's, 12
PEPP. L. REV. 427, 508-09 (1985).
no worse off than if there were no Medicaid funding at all.151 This
sentiment was repeated in 1991 in Rust v. Sullivan.152
3. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services' 53 the Court upheld a
Missouri law proscribing the use of public facilities or employees to
perform abortions.154 Missouri already had a law prohibiting public
funds from being used for abortion155 and thus, the Court reasoned
that the woman would have no greater burden if she was required to
go to a private center for the procedure.156 The Court, relying on
both Maher and McRae to reach its decision in Webster, stated that
"to use public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abor-
tion places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who
chooses to terminate her pregnancy.' "157
Interestingly, in Webster, the Eighth Circuit also declared uncon-
stitutional the prohibition against the use of state funds, employees
and facilities for abortion counseling.158 The State appealed only the
use of funds and not the employee or facility ban, and subsequently,
that part of the lower court decision still stands.59 Ultimately, be-
cause the fund restriction was limited to only "persons responsible
for expending public funds," the Court found that the restriction was
not aimed at any physician, making the issue moot as to the Webster
plaintiffs.16o However, the Court indicated that a serious controversy
could exist if the prohibition meant that publicly employed health
professionals could not give abortion advice to pregnant women.16 1
Maher v. Roe, Harris v. McRae and Webster v. Reproductive Serv-
ices suggest that the Court will not easily find that the restriction of
public funding associated with abortions is an impediment to a wo-
man's ability to obtain an abortion, as provided by Roe v. Wade.162
Maher, Harris and Webster comprise the abortion funding backdrop
against which Rust v. Sullivan was decided.
151. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
152. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776-77 (1991).
153. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
154. Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-08.
155. See supra note 150.
156. Webster, 492 U.S. at 509-10.
157. Id at 509 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
158. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub
nom Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
159. Webster, 492 U.S. at 511-12.
160. Id at 512-13.
161. Id at 524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the decision); Id.
at 539 n.1 (Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part.)
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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C. The Grswold163 "Penumbra" - The Right to Privacy
[Tihe right of privacy... is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.1 6 4
The "right to privacy" encompasses those interests the Supreme
Court has deemed fundamental rights.165 These include marriage,
child-bearing and child-rearing.166 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting the use and distribution of
contraceptives among married people. 167 That right of privacy was
extended to unmarried adults in Eisenstadt v. Baird.168 The
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions have been interpreted to mean
that "whether one person's body shall be the source of another life
must be left to that person and that person alone to decide."'169 The
abortion debate pits the principal of physical autonomy against the
equally compelling principal that innocent life must be preserved.170
Notwithstanding the fundamental controversy, the Court extended
the right of privacy to include a woman's decision whether to end her
pregnancy.171
163. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court
held that use of contraceptives by married persons could not be made a crime, and
subsequently, a person providing contraceptives could not be punished for a crime. Id.
at 485.
164. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
165. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. The Griswold Court found that the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments created a zone or penumbra where privacy is
protected from government intrusion. Id Prior to its Griswold decision, the Court rec-
ognized marriage and procreation rights as fundamental and invalidated a mandatory
sterilization statute for persons convicted of moral turpitude crimes. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). However, an earlier Court did not extend that
same fundamental right to the mentally disabled. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
166. See e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invali-
dating law prohibiting sales of contraceptives to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (allowing use of contraceptives by single people); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (allowing use of contraceptives between married people); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating mandatory sterilization of felons con-
victed of moral turpitude); Pierre v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing
parent's right to send children to parochial school).
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
168. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
169. TRIBE, supra note 177, at 1340.
170. Ad However, Professor Tribe articulates that there is no "clearer case of bod-
ily intrusion" than to require a woman to carry a child to term. Id
171. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
The Roe v. Wade Court held that only a compelling state interest could infringe on a
woman's right to an abortion and such an interest could not exist during the first tri-
mester when an abortion was medically safer than carrying the baby to term. Roe, 410
U.S. at 155-56, 163, 165. The decision allows the state to reasonably regulate abortions
The issue of privacy as it applies to abortion has been before the
Court many times. The Court has responded by invalidating laws
that threaten a woman's autonomy in her decision to have an abor-
tion.172 In particular, the Court invalidated state laws that unduly in-
fluenced a woman's informed consent whether to elect abortion or
childbirth.173The decisions since Roe v. Wade establish clearly that a
woman has a fundamental right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy.174
However, it is not clear that the Court considers abortion itself a
fundamental right.I75 This is an important distinction. A fundamen-
in the second trimester to ensure a safe procedure, and to proscribe abortion in the
third trimester when the fetus is deemed viable. Id. at 163.
Justice Rehnquist argued in a dissenting opinion that the abortion issue did not raise
a right to privacy claim. Id. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) By definition, a "transac-
tion resulting in an operation... is not 'private' in the ordinary sense of the word." Id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Professor Tribe prefers the term "autonomy" to "privacy" to describe a woman's
right to decide whether to bear a child. TRIBE, supra note 177, at 1352.
172. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 763-78 (1986) (stating that a woman is entitled to protection from harass-
ment in exercising her constitutional right to control her reproductive choices); Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983) (invalidating a
law that went beyond ensuring a woman's consent to the abortion and attempted to
influence a woman's "informed choice between abortion and childbirth"); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976) (noting that record keeping was permis-
sible during the first trimester as long as the process was not so burdensome that it
became an unconstitutional restriction).
However, the Court has been willing to require that a minor notice a parent prior to
an abortion. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). See generally, Selina K.
Hewitt, Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota: Chipping Away at Roe v. Wade In the Aftermath
of Webster 18 PEPP. L. REV. 955 (1991) (explaining the impact of upholding the coun-
try's strictest parental notification statute).
173. The Court has invalidated laws that attempt to persuade a woman to withhold
consent to an abortion. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. at 443-44 (invalidating a law that re-
quired information "not to inform the woman's consent, but to persuade her to with-
hold it altogether"). The Court has not upheld laws requiring a woman to be advised
of available assistance from the father or social services. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 759-63 (concerning prenatal care and childbirth counseling requirements).
174. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. Although the majority decision in Akron supported
the principles set forth in Roe v. Wade, the basic tenets are not secure in the law. See
generally Guttmacher, Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 415 (1968);
TRIBE, supra note 77 at 1347 n.69, 71.
In Maher v. Roe, the Court emphasized that "[a] woman has at least an equal right to
choose to carry her fetus to term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procrea-
tion without state interference has long been recognized as 'one of the basic civil rights
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.'" Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
175. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520, 3058 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, J.J.) (stating that Jus-
tice Rehnquist was relunctant "to elaborate the abstract differences between a
'fundamental right' to abortion .... a 'limited fundamental constitutional right,' . . . or
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause"). The plurality opinion in
Webster indicated that the right to an abortion was a liberty interest. Id. See also
Christopher A. Crain, Note, Judicial Restraint and the Non-Decision in Webster v. Re-
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tal right can only be upset if there is a compelling state interest.176
Roe v. Wade gave a woman the fundamental right to choose an abor-
tion, but apparently not to have the abortion itself.177 This allows
the Court to apply a less stringent standard when reviewing cases
that impact the abortion decision, but which do not directly restrict
or bar a woman's right to make that decision.178 The result can be
seen in cases regarding federal funding for abortion cases, which
culminated in the Rust v. Sullivan decision.
productive Health Services, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263 (1990). Professors Farber
and Nowak believe that "[t]o the extent the distinction is relevant . .. abortion is a
fundamental right." Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Ju-
dicial EMxrience With the 1980's "Reasonableness" Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 533 n.73
(1990).
Fundamental rights, outside the abortion realm, recognized by the Court include:
freedom of Association (NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61. (1958)); liberty inter-
ests (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); marriage and procreation (Skinner 316,
U.S. at 541.), and privacy interests (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965))
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). See Farber & Nowak, supra note 175
at 523 (pointing out that in the mid-1980s it was "black letter" law that Roe v. Wade
required strict scrutiny only to decide if the pre-viability regulation was a "reasonable
health regulation"). Farber and Nowak suggest that the Roe v. Wade standard was too
limiting and has fallen away to a "reasonableness" test that reflects the unwritten
rules that an abortion regulation will be upheld if it will:
(1) [P]rotect the woman's health, (2) ensure that minors make responsible
decisions, or (3) protect a viable or potentially viable fetus. A health regula-
tion may not unduly burden the right to abortion. Statutes protecting possibly
viable fetuses must not be so vague as to deter abortions of nonviable fetuses
and must allow abortions when a physician finds a significant threat to the life
or health of the woman. So long as it does not impose a significant barrier to,
or a penalty for, abortions, the state may take other steps to discourage wo-
men from choosing to have an abortion.
Id. at 520-21.
177. Justice Blackmun, author of the Roe v. Wade opinion, would likely disagree.
Roe v. Wade declared that there could be no compelling state interest in the first tri-
mester worthy of denying a woman the right to abortion, and therefore created a vir-
tual right to an abortion during the first trimester. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. This is
contrary to the companion case where the Court stated that there there was no right
to "abortions on demand." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
178. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1345. See also James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Separa-
tion of Powers Doctrine: Straining out Gnats, Swallowing Camels?, 18 PEPP. L. REV.
96, 115-16 (1990) But see Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and
the Lochean Liberal Tradition:L Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L. J. E.
723, 752 (1990) (asserting that "society has a sufficiently compelling interest that justi-
fies legislative regulations").
Justice O'Connor believes that when abortion regulations are at issue, the court
should determine whether the laws bear a rational relation to a legitimate state inter-
est. Thornburgh, 4:76 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The rational basis test is
elevated to strict scrutiny when an "undue burden" is placed on a fundamental right.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-63 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting.)
IV. ANALYSIS OF RUST V. SULLIVAN
A. Facts of the Case and Procedural History
Dr. Irving Rust is described as "[a] soft-spoken, Harlem-raised phy-
sician,"179 who faithfully followed the section 1008 ban on performing
abortions using Title X funds.iS0 However, when the Secretary
promulgated the new regulations in 1988,181 Dr. Rust, along with
other doctors impacted by the new regulations, and Title X recipi-
ents, challenged the legality of the regulations.l82 Four suits were
filed by December 7, 1988, which caused the Secretary to issue a "No-
tice of Court Action," advising that the new regulations would not
immediately affect all Title X recipients, until the appellate process
was complete.183
The circuits were split in their interpretation of the constitutional-
ity of the new regulations.' 84 The First Circuit in Massachusetts v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services upheld an injunction
against the new regulations, stating that the new regulations were
unconstitutional because they created a "significant obstacle" in the
path of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 8 5 The obsta-
179. Ellen Goodman, A Purley Political Decision by the Court, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 29, 1991, at A10.
180. 1& Dr. Rust is the Medical Director of the Bronx Center of Planned
Parenthood of New York City, Inc. which received fifty percent of its family planning
budget from Title X funds. See New York v. Bowen, 690 F.Supp. 1261, 1263 (1988).
181. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
182. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766 (1991).
183. 53 Fed. Reg. 49,3202-02 (1988). The notice stated:
Four suits were filed in three jurisdictions by various organizations and indi-
viduals seeking to have the February 2nd rules declared invalid and their op-
erations enjoined. In two of the suits, permanent injunctions were entered
enjoining the Department from enforcing the rules against the parties to
those suits.... In the remaining two suits, the government prevailed and the
complaints were dismissed.... As a result of this court action, the rules
promulgated on February 2, 1988 are currently effective with respect to cer-
tain organizations and not with respect to others.
Id.
184. Compare Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d
53 (1st Cir. 1990) (invalidating the new regulations), and Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990) (same), with New York v.
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1989) (upholding the regulations).
185. Massachusetts, 899 F.2d at 65. The court first applied a four-part test to deter-
mine congressional intent. Id at 58. These factors included: "(1) [T]he language of
the statute; (2) the contemporaneous legislative history; (3) any subsequent legislative
history, and (4) agency interpretation(s) of the statute." Id (citing Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108-20 (1980)). Applying the four-part
test, the court found the statutory language inconclusive, and the legislative history in-
conclusive except for the history pertaining to the physical and financial separation of
facilities outlined in section 59.9, which the court believed violated congressional in-
tent. I& at 58-60. The court agreed with the Secretary's argument that subsequent rat-
ification of the original Title X wording did not "necessarily indicate that the new
regulations violated congressional intent." Id. at 61. Finally, the court found that a
heightened standard of review was unwarranted and that the Secretary provided some
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cles created included regulating the physician-patient dialogue and
restricting private funds for abortion counseling and services.'8 6
In Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Sullivan, the
Tenth Circuit also affirmed an injunction against the regulations,
holding that the regulations violated both the First and Fifth Amend-
ments. 8 7 The court essentially followed the same path as the First
Circuit by initially determining whether the 1988 regulations were
permissible under the statute.'88 The Planned Parenthood court
agreed with the First Circuit in concluding that only the section of
the new regulations requiring separate physical facilities was an im-
permissible construction of the statute.'8 9 It did not find the Maher
v. Roe, Harris v.McRae and Webster v. Reproductive Services 190 line
of cases controlling.191 Where the statutes in Maher and its progeny
were held not to place any new obstacle in a woman's quest to obtain
an abortion, 92 the new Title X regulations led the Court to an inap-
posite result.193
In New York v. Sullivan,194 the first of the three United States
Court of Appeals cases to be decided, the Second Circuit held that
the regulations were a permissible construction of Title X and that
the regulations passed the constitutional challenge.195 The Sullivan
court found that all of the new regulations comported with the Title
X statute and the authority granted to the Secretary under that stat-
evidence of a "reasoned basis for change." Id. at 62-64. Based on the foregoing analy-
sis, the First Circuit decided that the court must address the constitutional issues
presented in the new regulations. Id. at 64.
186. Id. at 70-71.
187. 913 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990). The Tenth Circuit found itself in accord
with the First Circuit on the constitutional issues.
188. Id. at 1503.
189. Id. at 1497. The court referred to 42 U.S.C. section 300a-6 which prohibits dis-
crimination against personnel who decline to perform abortions to support its conclu-
sion that section 59.9, which results in the denial of Title X grants when the grantee
was unable to meet the separation requirement, violated congressional intent. Id. at
1498.
190. See supra notes 132-162 and accompanying text.
191. Planned Parenthood, 913 F.3d at 1499.
192. See supra notes 129-162 and accompanying text.
193. Planned Parenthood, 913 F.2d at 1501.
"[B]y denying Title X providers the right to mention abortion, to refer to
abortion as an option, or to provide professional referrals to others whom they
know will counsel about all medical options that are legal, including abortion,
the government has placed a state-created 'obstacle in the path of a woman's
exercise of her freedom of choice.'"
Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
194. 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
195. Id. at 404.
ute to administer the regulations.196 Relying on Chevron US.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, In., 197 the Court concluded
that the Secretary's interpretation merited deference, even where it
was sharply different from earlier interpretations.198 The Second
Circuit, contrary to the First and Tenth Circuits, determined that the
1988 regulations "create[d] no affirmative legal barriers to access to
abortion."199 The court found them constitutional under the ration-
ale of Webster v. Reproductive Services.20 0 Further, the Sullivan
court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment
rights of either the Title X recipient employees or their clients.201
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit in Rust v. Sulli-
van,202 and thus resolved the split among the Courts of Appeal.
B. Analysis of the Case
1. Majority Opinion
a. The Secretary's Interpretation Merits "Substantial Deference"
The Supreme Court previously established that abortion funding
cases would be scrutinized using the rational basis test.203 Under a
rational basis test, the Court consistently has upheld restrictions on
the public funding of abortion.204 Notwithstanding that background,
the threshold question of whether the Secretary's new interpretation
of Title X was a permissible interpretation of the statute became crit-
ical to the outcome of Rust v. Sullivan.
In Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,205 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of ambiguous regula-
tory language and established that the agency's reasonable interpre-
196. Id, at 404-10.
197. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
198. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 409.
199. Id, at 411.
200. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). See supra notes 153-161 and accompanying text.
201. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 412.
202. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court in which Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia and Souter joined. Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, joined in Part I
by Justice O'Connor and joined in parts II and III by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens
and Justice O'Connor each filed a separate dissenting opinion.
203. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977). Under the rational basis test, a
law will be upheld if it rationally relates to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). For a discussion of
the rational basis test applied to abortion funding see McGoldrick, supra note 178, at
115-16.
204. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Professor McGoldrick ponders
whether the abortion funding cases may have turned out differently if the Court ap-
plied a reasonable basis test that would have given more consideration to the "interest
of indigent women." McGoldrick, supra note 178, at 119.
205. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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tation would prevail when ambiguity existed.2 6 All of the lower
courts reviewing the Secretary's new regulations, as well as the
Supreme Court, agreed that the language of section 1008 was ambigu-
ous. 207 Further, the legislative history of section 1008 does not clarify
the congressional intent behind the phrase that "[n]one of the funds
* . . shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning."208 Once the Supreme Court concluded that the statute
was ambiguous, then the Secretary's interpretation could only be de-
nied if it was found to be unreasonable, or if the Secretary's construc-
tion was deemed an otherwise permissible construction that raised
"serious constitutional problems." 209
.
The Court applied substantial deference in reviewing the Secre-
tary's new regulations, stating that "[t]he Secretary's construction of
Title X may not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a
plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and does
not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent."21 0 Relying
on C0evron, the Court guaranteed the acceptance of the Secretary's
new regulations by requiring only that the interpretation be a per-
missible construction.21 ' Neither side of the Rust v. Sullivan debate
persuasively argued that Congress had indeed indicated its intent on
the questions of funding abortion referral and counseling,21 2 or re-
quiring that Title X clinics maintain financially and physically sepa-
rate facilities. 21 3
Dr. Rust argued that the Secretary's new regulations merited little
206. Id at 843. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074 (1990). Professor Sunstein notes that the Chevron decision
is a break with the conclusion that courts determine the law, and bestows greater au-
tonomy on agencies. Id.
207. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991). See supra notes 184-201 and ac-
companying text for the lower courts' decisions, and supra notes 15-34 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of section 1008.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1990).
209. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
210. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
211. Id. at 1767. The petitioners averred that the 1988 regulations were an imper-
missible construction since they raised "grave constitutional concerns." See United
States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
212. The records of the lower courts show that the consensus was that Congress
had not addressed the scope of the abortion ban in section 1008. See, e.g., Massachu-
setts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 58-61 (1st Cir. 1990); Planned Parenthood v. Sullivan, 913
F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1989)
(all agreeing that Congress had not addressed the scope of the abortion prohibition).
213. Rust 111 S. Ct at 1768-69. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion on the requirement of separate facilities.
or no deference because they abandoned the historical application of
section 1008 which allowed, and in fact required, nondirective abor-
tion counseling.214 However, the Supreme Court addressed this spe-
cific point in Chevron, and rejected Dr. Rust's position based on the
principle that an agency's interpretation is not penalized even when
"'it represents a sharp break with prior interpretation' of the statute
in question."215 Chevron had been interpreted, perhaps incorrectly,
to mean that less deference would be given an agency's interpretation
when a regulation was new or deviated from prior construction. 216
An extraneous result of the Rust v. Sullivan decision is that it obvi-
ates the inclination to give new regulations, or novel interpretations
of regulations, less deference. 217
The Supreme Court did not address the question of agency bias in
determining that the Secretary's interpretation deserved substantial
deference.218 The 1988 regulations were promulgated at the urging of
the Reagan administration. 219 In a political system where different
parties control the executive and legislative branches, an agency reg-
ulation written at the request of the executive branch is prone to re-
flect the administration's intent and not necessarily the intent of
Congress. In such instances, one must question the logic behind con-
cluding that the agency is better able than the judiciary to interpret
congressional intent.220
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court found that the Secretary had ex-
plained the change in the interpretation of Title X regarding the ban
on abortion counseling and referral with a "reasoned analysis." 221 In
214. Brief for Petitioners, at 20, in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 89-
1392). See also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
215. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769 (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984)).
216. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 206, at 2101-02 (stating that new regulations or
new interpretations of regulations receive less deference). However, Sunstein asserts
that it is an incorrect application of Chevron to give new interpretations of regulations
less deference. l at 2102. The intent behind the Chevron decision was to eliminate
strict adherence to the past and allow flexibility for the law to change with the times.
Id.
217. Compare Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768
(1990) (holding that once the Court has affirmed an agency interpretation of a statute,
the agency cannot reinterpret the statute even if there is a change of circumstances);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (propounding
that where Congress reenacts a statute without pertinent change, then the historical
administrative interpretation is deemed evidence of Congressional intent) with NLRB
w. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990); and Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n. of United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983) (stating that an agency's rules need not last forever).
218. Sunstein, supra note 206, at 2101 (explaining that in cases where an agency's
interpretation "predictably lines up with agency self-interest or bias," deference should
not be applied).
219. See supra note 35.
220. Sunstein, supra note 206, at 2101.
221. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991).
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reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the reports from the
General Accounting Office and the Office of the Inspector General,
which indicated that the agency had not successfully presented its
view on the scope of the abortion ban.2 22 Further, the Court found
"sufficient" the Secretary's statement that the public attitude had
shifted against "elimination of unborn children by abortion."2 2 3
The Court specifically addressed the 1988 requirement that clinics
receiving Title X grants maintain separate personnel, records, and fa-
cilities from any abortion related activity. 224 The Secretary proposed
that the separation requirements were necessary to ensure that abor-
tion was not advanced as a family planning alternative.225 Justice
Rehnquist found Congress clear on this point,226 and concluded that
Congress intended to separate Title X funds from abortion-related
funds.227 The Court deferred to the Secretary in determining that
the separate facilities requirement was not unreasonable and was
necessary to achieve the goal of section 1008.228
b. The Regulations Do Not Raise Grave Constitutional Concerns
Justice Rehnquist summarily dismissed the proposition that the
1988 regulations raised "serious questions of constitutional law."229
The dissenting Justices disagreed with this conclusion.230 The major-
ity conceded that some constitutional questions were raised by the
222. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
223. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769. The Secretary's authority for this conclusion is not
mentioned. While one may easily accept that a majority of the country finds the kill-
ing of unborn children repugnant, this begs the issue of Rust v. Sullivan. Rust is not a
challenge to the abortion right established in Roe v. Wade, but rather a question of
how far the government can go to promote or impede a woman's access to abortion.
There are ample surveys and polls to support the contention that a majority continue
to support a woman's right to decide whether or not to bear a child. See Farber & No-
wak, supra note 175 at 536 n.89. In 1989, only 17% of those polled favored a complete
ban on abortion. Id After the Webster decision, 68% stated "that even in cases where
they might think abortion is wrong, the government has no business preventing a wo-
man from having an abortion." Id (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at A18.
224. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9.
225. 53 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1988).
226. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1770.
227. 1d
228. Id. Justice Rehnquist did not address the consequences on the 4,000 Title X
grantees. See supra note 71.
229. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771. The majority decision agrees with established law that
a federal statute should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions. See Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (construction of a section of Railway Labor
Act requiring " 'financial support"' of collective bargaining units).
230. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in which Marshall, J., and
O'Connor, J., join in this part).
regulations, but the questions were not so "grave and doubtful" to
conclude that Congress did not authorize the construction. 231 Justice
Rehnquist indicated that the majority was disinclined to give more
than passing consideration to the constitutional issue by remarking
that any set of regulations more restrictive than the existing regula-
tions "would be challenged on constitutional grounds."23 2
i. First Amendment Issues
One of the most serious questions raised in Rust v. Sullivan is the
extent to which government can promote or discriminate against a
,view through financial subsidies.23 3 Entangled in this debate is the
doctor-patient relationship, a Title X client's right to be informed of
abortion options, and the clinic employee's right to discuss abortion
in the context of his or her employment. 234
Dr. Rust posited that the 1988 regulations amounted to impermissi-
ble viewpoint discrimination because they precluded lawful informa-
tion about abortion as an option while promoting information about
continuing pregnancy.2 35 Consequently, the petitioners contended,
the new regulations infringed on the First Amendment rights of Ti-
tle X clients and staff.238 Dr. Rust based his argument on the state-
ment in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,237
that the government may not manipulate subsidies in order to
achieve "'the suppression of dangerous ideas'." 23 8 The current ad-
ministration has clearly stated that it does not support abortion.239
Dr. Rust was likely correct in his assessment that the administration
perceived abortion as a "dangerous idea."240
The petitioners faced an uphill battle when framing the argument
in the context of abortion funding.24x Justice Rehnquist dismissed
the constitutional attack with the simple statement that "It]here is no
question but that the statutory prohibition contained in [section] 1008
231. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771 (citing United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366 (1909)).
232. Id. at 1771.
233. See supra notes 107-128 and accompanying text.
234. See iOfra notes 361-383 and accompanying text.
235. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), (No. 89-
1391).
236. Id.
237. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
238. Id, at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
239. See, e.g., Bush Says Compromise May Be Possible on Abortion Bill, UPI, July
11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that Bush would not
change his fundamental position against abortion).
240. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (No.89-
1391)
241. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
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is constitutional." 242 The Court has been clear in its assessment that
the "government may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and... implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds.' -243
Justice Rehnquist reiterated that the government does not violate
the Constitution by promoting activities which the government de-
cides are in the best interest of the public, even when that results in
the nonfunding of activities that support an opposite viewpoint.2 44
Further, he asserted that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."245
Rust v. Sullivan brings the Court's abortion funding decisions to a
new level, entangling abortion funding with First Amendment pro-
tection of free speech.246 In previous decisions the Supreme Court
has been skeptical of government conditions involving First Amend-
ment protections. The Court struck down a ban on editorials by pub-
licly funded radio stations,2 47 denied a tax on general interest
magazines that violated the First Amendment by discriminating
against a small group of magazines, 248 and invalidated a law that
banned one type of peaceful picketing while allowing another.249 In
upholding the ban on abortion counseling, referral and activism, all
which must be considered First Amendment activities, the Court did
not attempt to explain why the previous line of cases were not appro-
242. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991).
243. Id (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
244. Id.
245. Id (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)).
Pro-choice activists may find some solace from the Chief Justice's choice of quotes if it
can be inferred that abortion is deemed a fundamental right. See supra notes 165-178
and accompanying text.
246. Supra notes 44-58 and 132.
247. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984) (invalidating an
editorial ban that singled out particular speakers and prevented them from communi-
cating with a selected audience). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) (stating that there is a "profound national commitment ... that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
248. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). Arkansas
Writers' Project involved an Arkansas tax on general interest magazines that ex-
empted newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals. Id. at 224.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, found that the discriminatory tax burdened
the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, even though there was no "im-
proper censorial motive." Id at 227-29.
249. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Mosley presented both
the first and fourteenth amendment issues. Id, at 95-96. Mosley stands for the proposi-
tion that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views." Id. at 96.
priate in Rust v. Sullivan; rather, it stated that petitioner's reliance
on these cases was misplaced.25 0 Justice Rehnquist rationalized that
the Court was not impeding a group's activities on the basis of
speech, but merely refusing to fund certain activities that tangen-
tially included speech.251
It is difficult to align the Title X ban on abortion counseling and
referral with the Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Sinderman,252
if one takes at face value the statement that the government may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitution-
ally protected interests-especially, his interests in freedom of
speech.2 5 3 There is no question that a Title X clinic loses the benefits
of Title X funds if the staff engages in the prohibited speech.254 The
majority adopted the position that the new regulations did not con-
strain a benefit at all, but instead the regulations "insist that public
funds be spent for the purpose for which they were authorized."255
While it may seem clear to the majority that the "purpose" did not
include abortion counseling and referral, the history of Title X and
its eighteen years of application prior to the new guidelines suggest
that the purpose for which the funds were authorized likely included
abortion counseling and referral.256
The majority opined that a law is constitutional if it simply inhibits
a constitutionally protected right in a limited context, while leaving
that right unaffected in another context.257 The Title X speech ban
impacts the Title X clinic and its staff only in the context of clinic
activity, and does not preclude the Title X grantee from engaging in
abortion-related activities provided such activities are not connected
with a Title X program. 258 In one fell swoop the majority dismissed
the contention that the regulations impose an unconstitutional condi-
tion by highlighting that the Title X grantee and the Title X staff
have other choices.259
The majority opinion was not concerned with the fact that the new
250. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, at 1773 (1991).
251. Id at 1773.
252. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
253. Id at 597.
254. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
255. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773 (1991).
256. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Secre-
tary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding the legisla-
tive history inconclusive).
257. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
258. I& at 1774. See also Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
546 (1983) (deciding that Congress did not impede first amendment rights by refusing
to fund lobbying activities).
259. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575
(1984) (teaching that first amendment rights are not violated where giving up the fed-
eral funds eliminates the condition).
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regulations restricted not only Title X funds, but other matching
funds and grant-related income.260 The solution, on its face, is sim-
ple: If the clinic does not like the conditions, it can forego the federal
funds.261 Further, a Title X clinic is not constrained from using
wholly private funds to finance abortion related activities outside of
Title X program.2 62 Therefore, a Title X recipient who chooses to
continue accepting Title X funds impliedly consents to the restric-
tions on all funds.263
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that allowing the fund recipient
an alternate avenue to present his or her ideas is not always adequate
to justify government control attached to funding.264 In United
States v. Kokinda,265 the Court postulated that the government need
only a reasonable basis to restrict activity protected by the First
Amendment when the forum was not traditionally used as a public
forum "dedicated ... to First Amendment activity."266 Conversely,
the government cannot control speech through funding where the fo-
rum is a "traditional sphere of free expression." 26 7 In Rust v. Sulli-
van, Justice lReAhnquist suggested that the doctor-patient relationship
could be considered a traditional sphere, meriting the same protec-
tion as a university.268 However, the Court declined to carry the dis-
cussion further, finding instead that the Title X regulations did not
"significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship."269
A number of doctors disagreed with the majority conclusion.2 70
The Secretary suggested that if a doctor is queried about abortion, he
or she should respond that abortion is not considered an acceptable
260. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
261. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775.
262. Id,
263. Id. n.5.
264. Id. at 1776.
265. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
266. d, at 3116. Kokinda involved a group of political activists who had been con-
victed under a criminal statute for soliciting on postal premises. The activists set up a
table on the sidewalk leading into a post office. Justice O'Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that the postal premises were not a traditional forum for public speech,
and government ownership of property did not "automatically open that property to
the public." Id at 3119 (citations omitted). The government's prohibition of the activ-
ists' use of the property was decided using a reasonable test instead of the more strin-
gent strict scrutiny. d, at 3121-22.
267. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (explaining that a uni-
versity constitutes a traditional sphere and finding unconstitutional a statute making
treasonable or seditious words or acts grounds for removal from university employ).
268. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
269. Id.
270. See infra notes 375-76.
option for family planning.271 The doctor was precluded from dis-
cussing abortion as an option, even if the doctor determined that an
abortion was medically preferable to carrying the child to term.2 72
The Bush Administration recently lifted the strict ban on doctor-pa-
tient abortion dialogue.273 However, other clinic professionals re-
main under the ban on abortion counseling and referral.27 4
ii. Privacy Issues
Roe v. Wade was the landmark decision for affirming a woman's
privacy right in decisions affecting her own body.275 ' The Court reaf-
firmed that right when it stated that the government could not ob-
struct the decision of a woman on whether to obtain an abortion.27 6
Government interference was declared excessive when the State re-
quired physician disclosure or consent provisions that were slanted to
encourage a woman to choose childbirth over abortion.277
The majority opinion restated the proposition that government has
no duty to provide access to abortion simply because the right to
abortion is constitutionally protected.278 It is a short step to extend
that rationale to the notion that the government is under no duty to
inform a woman about her right to an abortion simply because that
right is constitutionally protected.
Justice Rehnquist dismissed the argument that the regulations vio-
late a woman's Fifth Amendment rights with the conclusion that
"[t]he difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project
does not provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no dif-
ferent position than she would have been if the government had not
enacted Title X."279 The Court appears to distinguish between an ac-
tive impediment, such as that found in Thornburgh v. American C0l-
271. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5).
272. Only in a medical emergency can a patient be referred to an emergency care
facility without regard as to whether or not the facility also provides abortions. Other-
wise the doctor is limited to providing a list of health care providers that meet the re-
quirement of Title X. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2)(1991).
273. David G. Savage, US. Modijies Abortion-Advice Rules for Clinics, L.A. TIMES,
March 21, 1992, at A-1.
274. Id.
275. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 1341.
276. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 428-30 (1983).
Akron invalidated a law that required informed consent provisions designed to influ-
ence a woman's choice between childbirth and abortion. Id. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at
119.
277. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 766 (1986); Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-49.
278. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1777 (1991). Following the path begun in
Maher, the Court simply extended the principle that Congress has no affirmative duty
to subsidize one activity even to the exclusion of another. See, e.g., Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989).
279. Rust, 111 S. Ct at 1777.
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lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,28 0 where a State law required
a physician to provide information discouraging abortion,28 1 and a
passive impediment, such as regulations requiring a physician's si-
lence on abortion.
Justice Rehnquist distinguished Thornburgh and Akron, comment-
ing that the invalidated laws in those cases required a physician to
provide patients contemplating an abortion with certain information,
regardless of whether the physician thought the information neces-
sary.28 2 On the other hand, he believed that the Title X regulations
did not impact a woman's ability to receive outside information about
abortion.28 3 While conceding that "[ilt would undoubtedly be easier
for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive information
about abortion from a Title X project,"28 4 the Court noted that the
government is not compelled to simplify obtaining an abortion.285
The majority's discussion of the right to privacy is brief, to the
point, and even more curious for its lack of depth and explanation.
Rust v. Sullivan is important not only for its impact on constitu-
tional issues but also for its insight into the inclination of the Court.
Rust v. Sullivan was the public's first opportunity to discover how
Justice Souter, the Court's newest Justice at that time, would decide
280. 476 U.s. 747 (1986).
281. Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act imposed impermissible abortion re-
straints by requiring a woman's informed consent include several mandatory disclo-
sures. Specifically, the statute stated that the woman must be advised 24 hours before
such consent of the name of the doctor performing the abortion; informed that there
could be "detrimental physical and psychological effects," of the medical risks in-
volved; told of the "gestational age"; and notified of the medical risks of carrying the
child to term. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760-61. Further, the act required the woman be
informed that:
There are many public and private agencies willing and able to help you to
carry your child to term, and to assist you and your child after your child is
born, whether you choose to keep your child or place him or her for adoption.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact them
before making a final decision about abortion. The law requires that your
physician or his agent give you the opportunity to call agencies like these
before you undergo an abortion.
Id, at 761. The Court held that the information was an "intrusive informational pre-
scriptiono" designed to discourage abortion through the "informed-consent dialogue
between the woman and her physician." Id at 762.
282. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
283. Id,
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1778. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977); Harris V. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
on abortion issues.286 Justice Souter joined the majority and pro-
vided the swing vote.28 7
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Rust v. Sullivan produced three separate dissenting opinions.28 8
Justice Blackmun filed the most analytical dissent and garnered the
concurrence of Justice Marshall and, in part, Justices O'Connor and
Stevens.
1. The Regulations do Raise Grave Constitutional Issues
Justice Blackmun first attacked the majority decision for "unneces-
sarily pass[ing] upon important questions of constitutional law."28 9 It
is well established that "federal statutes are to be so construed as to
avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality."2 90 The majority opin-
ion dismisses such doubts by stating the regulations do not raise
doubts of sufficient gravity to suggest they were not intended by
Congress.291
Justice Blackmun asserted that the language of section 1008 which
says that "[n]one of the funds .. .shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning" 292 is capable of a Constitu-
tional interpretation. 293 That interpretation would have limited the
prohibition of Title X funds to the act of performing an abortion and
would not have extended the prohibition to the protected area of
speech.294 The dissent persuasively reasoned that the Court is duty
bound to avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions where
Congress' intent is ambiguous, and is further bound to leave open the
questions until Congress tests the constitutional limits by explicitly
286. Forbidden Advice, WASH. POST, May 24, 1991, at A22; Daniel Wise, Ban on
Abortion Counseling Sustained, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1991, at 1.
287. The Supreme Court achieved a conservative majority when Justice Souter re-
placed Justice Brennan, who was a Roe v. Wade proponent. David 0. Stewart, The
Great Persuader, A.B.A. J., November, 1990 at 58. With the retirement of Justice Mar-
shall, another Roe v. Wade supporter, and the appointment of Clarence Thomas, the
Court needs only the right case to reconsider Roe v. Wade. See iqtfra notes 396-400 and
accompanying text. See also Marching to a Different Drummer, TIME, July 15, 1991, at
18, 21.
288. Dissents were filed by Justices Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, joined in
part I by Justice O'Connor, and joined in parts II and III by justice Stevens. Justices
O'Connor and Stevens each filed a separate dissent.
289. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
749 (1961)). See, e.g., United States v. Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (stating "[a] statute
must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score").
291. Id. at 1771.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1984).
293. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 1779 n.1.
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expressing its intent.295
Justice O'Connor analyzed the issue similar to Justice Blackmun
and would have invalidated the regulations because they raised "seri-
ous First Amendment concerns."29 6 Justice O'Connor agreed that
the legislative history shed no light on Congress' intended reach of
the section 1008 ban on the use of Title X funds.297 She reiterated
that where Congressional intent is not clearly to the contrary, then
the Court should construe a statute to avoid "serious constitutional
problems."298 Justice O'Connor declined to address the First and
Fifth Amendment issues raised by the Secretary's new regulations. 299
The majority decision, in effect, validates legislation before it is en-
acted by reaching the constitutional issues in the context of congres-
sional ambiguity.
Justice Stevens, alone, took the position that the section 1008 ban
on use of Title X funds is clearly a restriction on conduct and not on
speech.3oo Stevens put forth the argument that because the statute
had been interpreted using the plain language of the statute for the
previous eighteen years, the inference indicated that the Secretary
was not authorized to censor speech and he would hold the regula-
tions invalid.30:1 Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor's con-
clusion that the Secretary's new regulations were an unconstitutional
construction if the statute is indeed ambiguous.302 However, Justice
Stevens was then compelled to rebut the majority's analysis of the
constitutional issues and concurred with Justice Blackmun's analy-
sis. 3 0 3 This analysis is discussed next in this note.
295. d. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Sunstein appears to support
Justice Blackmun's statements when he suggests that agency interpretation should not
be given deference where constitutional doubts exist. See Sunstein, supra note 206, at
2113.
296. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
297. See supra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
298. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1788 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
Justice O'Connor would have told the Secretary that his interpretation was not reason-
able, thus allowing Congress to take up the battle if it so elected. Id. at 1789
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. I& at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In a society that abhors censorship and in
which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value on the freedom to com-
municate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority to regulate conduct im-
plicitly authorized the Executive to regulate speech." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
302. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. The Regulations Impermissably Infringe on First Amendment
Rights
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppression of
speech simply because that suppression was a condition upon the acceptance
of public funds. Whatever may be the Government's power to condition the
receipt of its largess upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely
does not extend to a condition that suppresses the recipient's cherished free-
dom of speech based solely upon the content or viewpoint of that speech. 3 04
The Court's opinions are replete with the sentiment that viewpoint
discrimination is antithetical to the First Amendment.3 0 5 The Court
has excepted this rule when the law at issue was deemed content-
neutral, so but has been disinclined to uphold a content-based regula-
tion.30 7 Justice Blackmun declared that the abortion-related speech
restriction is clearly content-based because it targets only counseling
and referral about abortion, while allowing counseling and referral
about other options.30 8 He believed that the regulation's proscription
of abortion advocacy necessarily produced the same conclusion.309
Justice Blackmun denigrated the majority's rationale that the gov-
ernment has "merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of
another,"310 and thus avoided the tag of viewpoint discrimination. He
announced that the majority had exceeded its boundaries by
"manipulating the content of the doctor/patient dialogue," 311 and cre-
ating an environment where the Title X employees are required to
foster a particular view about abortion.312 Justice Blackmun was un-
persuaded by the assertion that a Title X employee accepts the
speech restriction as a consequence of employment at a Title X
clinic.3 13 He believed that the government simply does not have the
option to require an employee to forfeit his or her First Amendment
rights as a condition of employment. 314
304. Id. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
305. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (allowing display of anti-govern-
ment signs near a foreign embassy); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (invalidating a discriminatory picketing regulation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958) (striking a tax code that reguired taking a loyalty oath to receive a property
tax exemption).
306. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
308. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1781 (Blackmun,'J., dissenting).
309. L (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
310. Id. at 1772.
311. Id. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
312. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17
(1977) (holding that requiring citizens to use license plates with the motto "Live Free
or Die" unconstitutionally fostered an ideological message).
313. Rust 111 S. Ct. at 1782 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
314. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relies on the Court's holding
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (stating "that a gov-
ernment may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the
First Amendment as a condition of public employment"). See also Rankin v. McPher-
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Justice Blackmun proposed that the regulations would not have
passed constitutional muster if the Court balanced the Title X project
employee's interest in discussing abortion against the government's
interest in preventing dissemination of abortion information.315 The
Title X physician has an ethical responsibility to provide patients
with complete information about medical options.31 6 On the other
hand, the government had other options less radical than the
abridgement of speech to ensure that section 1008 was upheld.3 17 Ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun, the majority, however, did not consider
the regulations to be an abridgement of free speech, and therefore
never looked at a balancing approach. 318
3. The Regulations are an Impermissible Restriction of Privacy
IRights
Justice Blackmun perceived the majority opinion as a direct af-
front to a woman's privacy rights extended to her by Roe v. Wade.319
That right is "the right... to be free from affirmative governmental
interference in her decision" whether or not to carry a child to
term.320 Contrary to the majority's conclusion that the regulations
do not impose any additional burden on a woman's ability to obtain
an abortion,32 1 Justice Blackmun concluded that by virtue of the re-
spect most patients accord a physician, the physicians incomplete in-
formation creates considerable obstacles that prevent a woman from
obtaining a legal abortion.322 "For these women, the Government
will have obliterated the freedom to choose as surely as if it had
son, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that a county employee could not be discharged for
remarks made during the working hours against the President).
315. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
316. See i;fra note 374.
317. Rust 111 S. Ct. at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For instance, the govern-
ment could have implemented more stringent bookkeeping requirements "or adopt[ed]
content-neutral rules for the balanced dissemination of family-planning and health in-
formation." Id at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) See supra notes 233-242, 257-263 and accompany-
ing text.
319. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 162-178 and accompanying text.
320. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
321. See supra notes 275-86 and accompanying text.
322. Id, at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justice reasons:
[Tihe Title X client will reasonably construe [the physician's words] as profes-
sional advice to forgo her right to obtain an abortion. As would most rational
patients, many of these women will follow that perceived advice and carry
their pregnancy to term, despite their needs to the contrary and despite the
safety of the abortion procedure for the vast majority of them. Others,
delayed by the Regulation's mandatory prenatal referral, will be prevented
banned abortion outright."3 23
V. IMPACT
"It is never so difficult to speak as when we are ashamed of our silence."3 2 4
"There is a fundamental difference between the prevention of conception and
the destruction of human life." 3 25
Rust v. Sullivan resulted in a firestorm of opponents and propo-
nents who emphasize the aspect of the decision that best suits their
cause. Opponents attack the decision for its impact on the rights of
free speech and privacy, while proponents exalt the decision for its
impact on abortion.
Regardless of the viewpoint one takes, it is undisputed that the de-
cision generated an enormous amount of political and social de-
bate.326 The debate culminated in a Congressional battle that failed
to overturn the restrictions in federally funded family planning clin-
ics upheld by the Rust v. Sullivan majority.327
A. New Boundaries for Federal Funding
There is a well-articulated policy against federal funding for abor-
tions.3 2s The Rust majority construed the Title X ban on abortion
counseling, referral and political activism as an extension of that es-
tablished policy. 329 If a Title X clinic is adverse to the conditions at-
tached to the funds, it may choose to decline the federal funds and
continue the forbidden activities.330 Such a simple solution created
such complex controversy.
from acquiring abortions during the period in which the process is medically
sound and constitutionally protected.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
323. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
324. Duc FRANCOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMs (quoted in DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 630 (1968)).
325. 116 CONG. REC. 37,375-79 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
326. A poll taken in California showed that 76 percent of the people polled knew
about the Rust v. Sullivan decision. Of those who knew about the ruling, 70 percent
disagreed with the Supreme Court's decision. The poll queried 605 adults during the
period May 30, 1991 to June 10, 1991. Susan Yoachan, Majority Supports Abortion
Rights, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., June 20, 1991, at A2.
327. See William J. Eaton, House Sustains Bush's Abortion Counseling Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at Al. The House was sucessful in presenting legislation that
would overturn the ban on abortion counseling and referral, but was unable to garner
enough votes to override the President's veto of the the bill. Id.
328. See supra notes 130-152 and accompanying text. On August 17, 1991, President
Bush vetoed a bill granting the District of Columbia federal funds because the legisla-
tion allowed the city to "finance abortions for poor women." John E. Yang & Rene
Sanchez, District Funding Bill Vetoed, Bush Cites Abortion in Rejecting Plan, WASH.
POST, Aug. 18, 1991, at Bi.
329. See supra notes 246-251 and accompanying text.
330. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 n.5 (1991). See also Presser & Presser,
Sending a Message, A.B.A. J. 32 (Aug. 1991).
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Rust v. Sullivan marks the first time the Court impacted the abor-
tion debate through the distribution of federal funds. 331 Moreover,
the decision may be the first time the Court upheld a regulation that
permits viewpoint discrimination through the allocation of federal
funds.3 32 Prior to Rust v. Sullivan, the Court took the stand that
"ideological viewpoint is a... repugnant ground upon which to base
funding decisions."3 33 The majority decision justified the result by
rationalizing that "the government has not discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclu-
sion of another."334 But in this case, the activity encompasses speech
previously protected under the First Amendment. Subsequently, the
boundaries for conditional government funding are hazier.
The government finances about half of the nation's medical
costs. 3 3 5 Rust v. Sullivan opens the doors for government regulation
within the medical community, but outside the abortion arena,
through the grant or denial of federal funds.336 When faced with
complying with the regulations or forfeiting federal funds, the auton-
omous medical community conceivably will choose the latter, and
subsequently reduce the medical care facilities that are open to the
indigent. 337
Some interpret the ramifications of Rust v. Sullivan as placing all
331. See supra notes 130-162 and accompanying text.
332. Rust, 111 3. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "By refusing to fund those
family-planning projects that advocate abortion because they advocate abortion, the
Government plainly has targeted a particular viewpoint." Id. at 1781 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
333. See id. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The government faces a tougher
battle in imposing speech restrictions outside the realm of federal funding. See supra
notes 87-128 and accompanying text. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989), the Court applied the policy that government could only restrict protected
speech if the restriction was "justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech .... narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and...
leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Ward,
491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 282,
293 (1984)).
334. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1772.
335. M. Gregg Bloche, Mandating Medical Deceit, WASH. POST, July 9, 1991 at A19
(stating that Rust v. Sullivan "gave the federal government constitutional authority to
mandate medical deceit whenever it pays for medical services").
336. Id.
337. Id. Dr. Bloche suggests that if government mandates that doctors mislead
their patients to promote a government view, the doctors may rebel and "the political
door to expanded public financing of care for the poor may close as doctors and hospi-
tals contemplate the invasive regulation that federal funding could bring." Id.
federally funded programs at risk.338 If the government is permitted
to promote a specific viewpoint through federal funding, then the
government can "constitutionally determine what is said."33 9 Even
more extreme is the sentiment that federally funded programs create
"coercion at best, prostitution at worst."3 40 Rust v. Sullivan advances
the idea that "when federal money is involved, the government's au-
thority to advance a particular social interest outweighs First
Amendment protections."34 1
Rust v. Sullivan reinforces the legal segment who asserts that gov-
ernment can write the script when they are paying for the produc-
tion.34 2 Government has never been required to finance views of
factions that disagree with the administration's position on a specific
topic.3 4 3 However, Rust v. Sullivan does not neatly fit into this ar-
guably acceptable area. Rust v. Sullivan is more analogous to the si-
lencing of an unpopular idea-a concept inapposite to the right to
free speech granted under the First Amendment. On the heels of the
Court's decision, Michigan passed a similar funding restriction.344
338. Martha Kuhlman, Rust Ruling Endangers First Amendment, LEGAL TIMES,
August 5. 1991, at 34.
339. Id. (quoting Deputy Ass't Attorney General Leslie Southwick). In fact, Ms.
Kuhlman points to the information that "some librarians have been pressured to re-
move books containing information on abortion." Id. The United States Soliciter
General Kenneth W. Starr is credited with remarking that "It]he government is able to
take sides; it is able to have viewpoints when it is funding. It can choose to fund
Shakespeare and decline to fund Moliere." See Ruth Marcus, Abortion - Advice Ban
Upheld For Federally Funded Clinics, WASH. POST, May 24, 1991 at Al.
340. Gary McDowell, The Wrong Approach to Tort Reform, TEx. LAW., August 5.
1991, at 17. Professor McDowell addresses the administration's attempt to regulate the
medical malpractice costs through the proposed Health Care Liability Reform and
Quality of Care Improvement Act, which would penalize a state for not meeting fed-
eral guidelines by eliminating some federal payments under Medicare and Medicaid.
Id.
A similar view is that the federal funding impact from Rust v. Sullivan results in
"legalized bribery." Bella English, Gag Dangerous as a Precedent, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 10, 1991, at 17.
341. Joe Patrick Bean, Trouble Ahead for First Amendment, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 8, 1991, at 18. See also Marilyn Goldstein, Riding the 'A' Train of
Thought, NEWSDAY, July 12, 1991, at 6 (suggesting, tongue in cheek, that the govern-
ment could restrain bankruptcy advice, tax advice, etc., based on a particular point of
view).
If one accepts the premise that the new Title X regulations were at least in part
promulgated as a result of anti-abortion sentiments, then Rust v. Sullivan empowers
well-funded, vocal or well-organized lobbies to control information through govern-
ment funding. Faye Wattleton, address to The National Press Club (June 16, 1991)
(published by Federal News Service), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
342. Mark N. Troobnick, Free Speech and Abortion: High Court is Right on the
Money, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1991 at 97.
343. Id. For instance, the government does not have to provide radio space on the
Voice of America to dissident factions. Id.
344. See, e.g., Michigan to End Tax-Funded Abortion Counseling, Newswire, June 4,
1991 (financial news), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. The Michigan
policy to cease state funding of clinics that forego the federal funds and continue to
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One may expect those states with strong anti-abortion sentiments to
follow suit and deny state funds to family planning clinics who coun-
sel or refer for abortion.
B. Changes in Family Planning
The impact of Rust v. Sullivan will be felt most profoundly in the
area of family planning, whether it be in the family planning clinics,
or on the family planning clients.
Immediately after the announcement of the Rust v. Sullivan deci-
sion, clinics around the country announced their intent to give up
their Title X federal funds and continue to provide abortion counsel-
ing and referral.345 In some cases, the state and local governments
rallied behind the clinics with promises of increased state, local and
private support.346 However, at other clinics, choosing to forego fed-
eral funds or to comply with the regulations results in an economic
hardship that impacts the quality of care provided4 7 or the continued
existence of the clinic itself.348 Thus, for some women the choice will
be fewer clinics or poorer care.
provide abortion counseling and referral was heralded by the pro-life organization,
"Right to Life of Michigan". Id
345. Nadine Brozan, Some Clinics Plan to Advise and Forego Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1991, at Al. Those clinics that intend to give up the Title X funds include clinics in
the South Bronx, New York, Vermont and California, and Planned Parenthood of
Greater Iowa. Id See also Amy Goldstein, Ruling Sows Distrus D.C. Area Clinics
Say; Some May Forego Funding, WASH. POST, May 24, 1991, at Al; John H. Kennedy,
Fiscal, Ethical Choices Face Counselors, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1991, at 26.
346. See, e.g., Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Disagrees With Ruling on Abortion,
L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1991, at Al; Florio Calls Abortion Rights Meeting, U.P.I., May 24,
1991 (Regional News) (N.J. and N.Y. Metro), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File; Proposed Legislation Would Aid New Jersey Family Planning Clinics, U.P.I.,
May 29, 1991 (Regional News) (N.J. and N.Y Metro), available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, UPI File.
347. See, e.g., Elaine Wood, Clinic Staffs Wrestle With Gag Order on Abortion, L.A.
TIMES, May 25, 1991, at B8 (stating that foregoing federal funds "means we're going to
serve less people, and we're already turning people away"); Mimi Hall, Pro-Choice
Backers: Ruling Endangers Women's Lives, USA TODAY, May 24, 1991, at Al (advis-
ing that the loss of federal funds will lead to a cutback in AIDS and pregnancy preven-
tion education). See also Kennedy, supra note 340.
348. The Title X requirement that the clinics be financially and physically separate
"threatens their ability to ... remain in operation at all." Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Brief of The American Public Health Association, et. al. at 26, Rust v. Sullivan 111 S.
Ct. 1759 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) (citing Declaration of Raymond Fink, Chairper-
son of the Medical and Health Research Assoc. of N.Y. City, Inc. attached to Joint Ap-
pendix at 159, Rust (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392)).
It is not disputed that some clinics provide abortions without Title X funds. These
clinics would now be required to staff a different facility for their abortion related ac-
tivities. See, e.g., Interview with Jeannine Michael on The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour
Title X funded programs are an important element of health care
in low-income communities.3 49 For many indigent women, Title X
programs provide the only access to reproductive information or
medical information in general.3 o The United States already suffers
the reputation as lagging far behind the European communities in
birth control.35 ' Providing fewer opportunities for poor women to
obtain birth control information will likely exacerbate an existing
problem.
Some opponents of the new regulations suggest that Title X funded
clinics provide services that reduce unwanted pregnancies and indi-
rectly decrease the number of abortions.3 52 If these clinics are forced
to close their doors because of insufficient funding, then it follows
that the number of unwanted pregnancies and, indirectly, abortions
will increase, producing an opposite result of that intended by the
new regulations.3s 3
Rust v. Sullivan arguably results in a "two-tiered health care sys-
tem."354 Women who must rely on federally funded programs be-
cause of their indigence receive incomplete information while women
who can afford private medical care generally receive complete infor-
mation.35 5 Again, the result contradicts the intent of Title X to pro-
vide "quality health care to poor women." 3
From an administrative point of view, Rust v. Sullivan effectively
defines the scope of the Title X ban on funding for abortions by up-
holding the new regulations.357 The previous General Accounting
Office finding that clinics were unsure of permissible activities3 58
should now disappear. However, the Secretary may still be busy po-
(May 28, 1991) (transcript by Educational Broadcasting and GWETA), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
349. Forrest, The Delivery of Family Planning Services in the United States, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 91 (1988).
350. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, Program Guidelines for
Project Grants for Family Planning Services, at 9.4 (1981) attached to Joint Appendix
at 70-71, Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759 (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
351. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Why Isn't Our Birth Control Better?, TIME, Aug. 12,1991
at 52. Elmer-DeWitt attributes the "sorry state of birth control in America" to an "in-
adequate range of options" and incomplete information. Id. at 52-53.
352. 137 CONG. REc. E1956 (daily ed. May 29, 1991) (statement of Rep. Don
Edwards).
353. Kristine M. Gebbie, A Personal Right That Cannot be Denied, SEArrLE TIMES,
July 17, 1991, at A9.
354. John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's Decision: Witholding In-
formation from Low-Income Pregnant Women Is Wrong, WASH. POST, June 7, 1991, at
A23; Martha Kuhlman, Rust Ruling Endangers First Amendment, LEGAL TIMES, Au-
gust 5, 1991, at 34.
355. John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's Decision, WASH. POST,
June 7, 1991, at A23.
356. Id
357. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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licing the new requirements for receipt of Title X funds.359 Clinics
are already suggesting ways to circumvent the ban on abortion coun-
seling and referral without giving up federal funds.360
C. Infringement on the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Justice William 0. Douglas announced thirty years ago that "the
right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights
seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no ex-
tended discussion."36 1 The Rehnquist Court added a new caveat in
Rust v. Sullivan by allowing the doctor to be silenced when his or
her advice is politically incorrect.3 6 2
An important canon of medical ethics requires that a physician
honor her patient's autonomy by giving the patient "complete and
truthful information about her medical condition and any proposed
treatment."36 3 Because providing such information is necessary to
enable the patient to make an informed decision about treatment, it
must be presented without bias that could affect the patient's deci-
sion.36 4 Abortion is a legal medical option to pregnancy,36 5 that the
decision in Rust v. Sullivan has effectively barred from presentation
in the context of federally funded family planning clinics. 6
Pregnancy can be unsafe when a number of medical conditions,
such as diabetes, cancer, neurologic diseases and cardiovascular dis-
359. Dr. William Archer, deputy assistant secretary for population affairs of the
Department of Health and Human Services, announced an intent to obtain compliance
from clinics before cutting off federal funds. Joyce Price, HHS Will Enforce Law On
Abortion Counseling, WASH. TIMES, May 30, 1991, at A3. Various pro-life groups an-
nounced their intent to assist the administration in policing the family planning clinics.
Id.
360. Mimi Hal], Some Clinics Take Money, Still Counsel About Abortion, U.S.A.
TODAY, May 28, 1991, at A2. A Kentucky clinic plans to "hand-off" pregnant clients to
employees in the clinic who do not receive federal funds. Id.; Mimi Hall, Clinics Side.
step Counseling Ban, U.S.A. TODAY, May 29, 1991, at A8.
361. See Nat Hentoff, A Muzzle on Medicine, WASH. POST, June 1, 1991, at A25
(quoting Justice William 0. Douglas).
362. Walter Dellinger, Conservatives Play Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, May 25. 1991, at 23.
363. Amici Curiae Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, et al. at 4-5, Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) citing
CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMER-
ICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 8.08 (1989)).
364. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Making Health Care Decisions 67-68
(1982) quoted in Amici Curiae Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, et al. at 6, Rust (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
365. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973).
366. See supra notes 230-259 and accompanying text.
eases, exist.36 7 If the Title X ban on abortion counseling and referral
is applied literally in all cases then those high risk pregnant clients
would be deprived of information about abortion where continuing
the pregnancy could result in complications or loss of life.368 How-
ever, the Court may have created a loophole in these situations. Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that the regulations did not appear to bar
advice about abortion when mandated by medical conditions because
such advice would be outside the scope of family planning.369 While
this interpretation may not have been the intent of the Secretary, 70
it resolves the conflict between full disclosure and the Title X restric-
tion in health- and life-threatening situations.
There is no loophole in the Title X ban on abortion counseling and
referral in the event of an unwanted pregnancy. It is estimated that
more that fifty percent of all pregnancies in the United States are un-
planned.3 7 1 Where the woman is unable to seek medical advice
outside of a Title X clinic, she will receive a list of health care provid-
ers weighted in favor of those providers who promote child birth.372
The regulations then result in a contradiction of established medical
criteria for advising a woman in the event of an unwanted preg-
nancy.373 Further, the ban on abortion counseling and referral may
367. Amici Curiae Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, et al. at 7-8, Rust v, Sullivan (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
The risks discussed include the following: A woman with diabetes has four times
the chance of suffering hypertension, and increased risks of severe infection and com-
plications. Id. (citing R. CREASY AND R. RESNICK, MATERNAL FETAL MEDICINE (2d ed.
1989)). Neurologic diseases, including multiple sclerosis, mayasthenia gravis, post-polio-
myelitis, epilepsy and some rental or sickle cell disease face "significant health risks."
Id. (citing J. BUTLER & D. WALBERT, ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAw 253 (3d ed.
1986)). Women with cardiovascular disease, including "primary pulmonary hyperten-
sion or congenital heart disease," face a high risk of "major disability and death." Id.
(citing MANAGEMENT OF HIGH-RIsK PREGNANCY 289-90 (J. Queenan ed. 2d ed. 1985)).
Pregnancy may mask the symptoms or worsen the condition for women with cancer.
Id. (citing E. FRIEDMAN, D. ACKER & B. SACHS, OBSTETRICAL DECISION MAKING 62 (2d
ed. 1987)).
368. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
369. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773 (1991). Cf. Nat Hentoff, A Muzzle on
Medicine, WASH. POST, June 1, 1991, at A25 (interpreting the exception to the abortion
counseling and referral ban to extend only to medical emergencies).
370. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
371. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Why Isn't Our Birth Control Better?, TIME, August 12,
1991, at 52 (reporting that 3.4 million of the 6 million pregnancies each year are un-
planned). An administrator at a Massachusetts family planning clinic estimates that 24
out of 25 pregnancies are unplanned. Carol Stocker, The Front Lines of Family Plan-
ning, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1991, at 25 (Living).
372. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
373. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists requires that in the
event of an unwanted pregnancy, the physician must advise the patient of all her op-
tions, including having the child, and either keeping the baby or placing the baby for
adoption, or aborting. See Amici Curiae Brief of the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, et al. at 9 (citing AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNE-
COLOGISTS STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICE 61 (7th ed. 1989)). See,
e.g., Transcript of ACLU Press Conference, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991) (discuss-
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be at odds with at least thirty states that impose liability on a physi-
cian for not disclosing all of a patient's medical options.3 74 The Title
X regulations create, at a minimum, a context for confusion to the
extent that they are inconsistent with medical ethic requirements3 75
and state laws requiring full disclosure.3 76
Physicians are vocal in their opposition to the new regulations.377
Implicit in the Rust v. Sullivan decision is the concept that although
a physician may be restricted from providing certain advice, the doc-
tor-patient relationship is unharmed. 78 The idea of full medical dis-
closure is a recent development in medical ethics, 3 79 is important for
ing Rust v. Sullivan, and participated in by Senators John Chafee (R-RI), Alan Cran-
ston (D-CA), Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Brock Adams (D-WA), Representatives Henry
Waxman (D-CA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), ACLU representatives Leslie Harris, Chief Ex-
ecutive Counsel, and Rachael Pine, and Planned Parenthood President Faye Wat-
tleton), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter ACLU Press
Conference].
374. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Brief for Petitioners at 32-33 n.58 and at Exhibit
B, Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) (citations omitted).
375. Martha Kuhlman, Rust Ruling Endangers First Amendment, LEGAL TIMES,
August 5, 1991, at 34.
376. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
377. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, The Doctors Take On Bush, TIME, August 5, 1991, at 52.
The day after the Rust v. Sullivan ruling, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists begim forming a lobbying coalition that resulted in a force consisting of
twenty-one health organizations with a membership of 425,000. Id.
See also Telling The Doctor What Not to Say, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at B4 (stating
that the American Medical Association, without opposition, "condemned the Rust rul-
ing" at the annual meeting); Belle English, Gag Dangerous as a Precedent, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 10, 1991, at A17 ("nearly every major medical association has come out
against the decision").
378. M. Gregg Bloche, Mandating Medical Deceit, WASH. POST, July 9, 1991, at A19.
Dr. Bloche refers to Justice Rehnquist's statement in Rust v. Sullivan dismissing the
possibility that a doctor's silence could be deemed misleading, since the clinics do not
provide pregnancy care. Id. As a practical matter, this conclusion appears unsup-
ported by fact or theory.
During a Senate hearing, a representative from the American Medical Association
testified, "From a physician's perspective, the decision of the Supreme Court... un-
dermines the underlying principles of the traditional doctor-patient relationship, in-
cluding the right of unrestricted communication of information about treatment
options available to patients." Martha Kuhlman, Rust Endangers First Amendment,
LEGAL TIMES, August 5, 1991, at 34.
See also John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's Decision: Withhold-
ing Information from Low-Income Pregnant Women is Wrong, WASH. POST, June 7,
1991, at A23.
379. Brief of Twenty-Two Biomedical Ethicists as Amici Curiae at 8, Rust v. Sulli-
maintaining patient autonomy,380 and is vital for supporting a doctor-
patient relationship built on trust.3 81 Rust v. Sullivan can be viewed
as a "government [effort] to exploit the traditional trust of the physi-
cian-patient relationship in order to steer needy women's health care
decisions in the direction of a medical treatment favored by the
government."38 2
The Title X clients will be equally affected as a result of Rust v.
Sullivan. The typical Title X client is poor, who generally depends
exclusively on the government for medical care.38 3 Some women
who would choose abortion if it were presented as an option will now
carry the baby to term or learn about the abortion option when the
risk associated with abortion is increased.3 4 For these women, the
doctor-patient relationship will have failed. On the other hand, those
women who would have elected abortion only because it was
presented as a rational solution to an unwanted pregnancy will avoid
the regrets and trauma associated with abortion.38 5
D. Impact on the Abortion Debate
Although the predominate issue in Rust v. Sullivan was not abor-
tion, the decision fueled an already heated abortion debate. Pro-life
activists believe that Rust v. Sullivan marks the eventual demise of
the constitutional right to an abortion emanating from the 1973 deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade.3 w8 The objections of the pro-choice activists
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392) (stating the "paternalistic approach
has given way to an autonomy model").
380. Id. at 9-10.
381. See Rust v. Sullivan 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1785-86 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
stating:
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship of
trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress
often attendant to health-related decisions requires that patients place their
complete confidence . .. in the hands of medical professionals. One seeks a
physician's aid not only for medication or diagnosis, but also for guidance, pro-
fessional judgment, and vital emotional support. Accordingly, each of us at-
taches profound importance and authority to the words of advice spoken by
the physician.
See also M. Gregg Bloche, Mandating Medical Deceit, WASH. POST, July 9, 1991, at
A19. Dr. Bloche argues that "muzzling the physician on reproductive matters threat-
ens the entire relationship. Patients do not trust a doctor who "tell[s] half-truths." Id.
382. Brief of Twenty-Two Biomedical Ethicists as Amici Curiae at 25, Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392).
383. See supra notes 348-349 and accompanying text. See also Kristine M. Gebbie,
A Personal Right That Cannot Be Denied, SEATTLE TimEs, July 17, 1991, at A9.
384. See, e.g., Comment of Senator Chafee in ACLU Press Conference, supra note
372.
385. Transcript of Congressional Pro-Life Caucus News Briefing, May 31, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (comments by Dr. Camilla Hersh and
Diane Solano, describing experience with patients considering abortion).
386. See, e.g., Linda Feldman, Abortion Issue Moves to Congress, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, May 28, 1991, at 6.
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center on the impact on a woman's privacy rights and free
speech 3 87 -but the opposition also centers on the fear that the road
to overturning Roe v. Wade has become shorter.3 88
Perhaps Louisiana's strict abortion legislation best exemplifies the
turn in the abortion road.38 9 The Louisiana legislature overrode the
governor's veto3 9 0 to enact what was called "the strictest anti-abor-
tion measure in the country."391 Like most of the country, 39 2 Louisi-
ana believed that the abortion legislation would pass muster with the
current United States Supreme Court if the bill became the test of
Roe v. Wade.393 The Louisiana abortion bill reverts to the pre-Roe v.
Wade days, when criminal penalties were imposed for the perform-
ance of abortions.394 A federal judge declared the Louisiana abortion
387. ld. See also, Mimi Hall, Ruling May Hurt Free Speech, U.S.A. TODAY, May 29,
1991, at A8.
388. Id See also David Broder, Women's Caucus Draws New Energy From an Un-
expected Source, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1991, at C27 (stating that "abortion rights are in
greater jeopardy today than at any point since NWPC [National Women's Political
Caucus] was in its infancy. Among the delegates, there was almost a sense of resigna-
tion that the Reagan-Bush appointees to the Supreme Court will soon reverse, or write
limits onto the 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion-rights decision").
389. See generally Joyce Price, Pro-Choice Forces Regroup, WASH. TIMES, June 20,
1991, at A3. Other states that have recently enacted tougher abortion laws include
Pennsylvania (reqdring notification of the husband, a 24 hour waiting period and fetal
development counseling), Utah (allowing abortion only where the fetus is gravely de-
fected or mother's health is jeopardized by pregnancy) and Guam (allowing abortion
only where pregnancy imperils a woman's life). Tamar Lewin, High Court has Several
options for New Look at Abortion Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at Al. Alabamba,
Ohio, Michigan and North Carolina are advancing bills that would impact a woman's
abortion decision. Pro-L(fe Bills Gain in States: Louisiana Latest to Pass Limits on
Abortion, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 1991, at A3.
390. The override vote was decisive with the Louisiana Senate voting twenty-nine
to nine in favor of override and the Louisiana House voting seventy-six to twenty-five
in favor of override. The Hotline, June 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File.
391. See, e.g., J. Michael Kennedy, Judge Sets Trial Date for Test of Louisiana
Abortion Law, L.A. TIMES, June 20,1991, at A15, col. 1.
392. See, e.g., Dennis Duggin, Freedom's Many Choices, NEWSDAY, August 13, 1991,
at 6 (stating that "the increasingly conservative Supreme Court has made it clear that
it stands with the so-called pro-life crowd").
393. Id There are several .other bills further along in the appellate process than
the Louisiana bill and which will likely reach the high court sooner. Pennsylvania,
Utah and Guam have abortion bills that could also be the test case for Roe v. Wade.
Louisiana Abortion Law is Halted in U.S. Court, N.Y. TIMES, August 8, 1991, at A16.
394. See Excerpts from New Measure Limiting Louisiana Abortions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1991, at All, col. 1. See George, supra note 150 at 435-45. States had statutes
prohibiting abortion from as early as 1821. Id. at 435. Most states had an exception
allowing abortion where the life of the mother was in jeopardy. Id. at 436. Various
statutes imposed criminal penalties on doctors for the act of abortion or where the
mother died as a result of the procedure, on women who sought abortions, and on the
legislation unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade clearing the way for
an appeal to the Supreme Court3 95 in a case that might be the right
case to reconsider Roe v. Wade.39 6
There is a general belief that if the right case reaches the Supreme
Court, Roe v. Wade will be overturned due to the conservative major-
ity.3 97 It is significant that Justice Souter cast the fifth and decisive
vote in Rust v. Sullivan, giving the first indication on how he is in-
clined to decide on abortion.398 It is of no small consequence that
Justice Marshall announced his retirement shortly after the decision
in Rust v. Sullivan.99 His retirement opened another opportunity
for the appointment of Justice Thomas, who will likely reflect the
administration's anti-abortion views and perhaps ring the death knell
for Roe v. Wade.400
E. Political Fallout
At the heart of the Rust v. Sullivan decision is the Court's defer-
ence to Congress and administrative agencies.401 This decision is one
of many suggesting that the current court is willing to contain its
own power in favor of enpowering the other branches of govern-
facilities where the abortion was performed. Id. at 438-39. From 1968 until the deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade, some states began to allow abortion in cases of rape or incest, or
where the fetus was seriously handicapped. Id at 441-45.
The Louisiana bill allows abortion where the mother's life is at risk, or in cases of
rape or incest if strict guidelines are met. N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at All.
395. Louisiana Abortion Law is Halted in the US. Court, N.Y. TIMES, August 8,
1991, at A16.
396. "When the constitutional invalidity of a State's abortion statute actually turns
upon the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexam-
ine Roe. And to do so carefully." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
526 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, it is believed that the Louisiana legislation was
drafted to meet that criteria needed for the Court to reconsider Roe v. Wade. Eileen
McNamara, Abortion and Congress, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1991, at 1.
397. Miranda S. Spivack, How States' Rights Can Rectify the Wrongs of the Suprme
Court; Abortion: With Roe vs. Wade Facing Reversa Feminists May Have to Resort to
50 Constitutions to Preserve It, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1991, at M2; Bruce Fein, Shaky
Future for Abortion Rights, WASH. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at G4.
398. See generally Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Advice Ban Upheld For Federally
Funded Clinics, WASH. POST, May 24, 1991, at Al (noting that Souter "sidled] with four
members of the court who are considered ready to vote to overturn... Roe v. Wade).
See also Linda Feldman, Abortion Issue Moves to Congress, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, May 28, 1991 at 6.
399. See, e.g., How Far Right?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 19.
400. At the time this note was written, Judge Clarence Thomas was the most re-
cent nominee for the Supreme Court. It is believed that he will vote with Justices
Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, and Scalia on abortion. See Donald Ayer, Commentary:
High Court Review, RECORDER, August 8, 1991 at 4; Marching to a Different Drum-
mer, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 18, 21.
401. See supra notes 205-228 and accompanying text. See also, Donald Ayer, Com-
mentary: High Court Review, RECORDER, August 8, 1991, at 4.
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ment. 40 2 It is therefore fitting that the question of federal funds for
abortion counseling and referral should return to the Congress to
resolve.403
In the wake of Rust v. Sullivan, the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentative's Energy and Commerce Committee passed bills allowing
federal funds to be used for abortion counseling and referral.40 4 As
generally predicted, the legislation was vetoed by the president.4 5
Congress was unable to override the veto.406 There is the added risk
that in an effort to ensure an unambiguous intent, Congress will take
the other extreme and mandate abortion counseling and referral.407
Compelling speech on a subject raises the same First Amendment is-
sues of free speech raised by the new regulations upheld in Rust v.
Sullivan.408
The abortion issue has been called a "'Molotov cocktail . . . ready
to explode.' "409 The Rust v. Sullivan decision created added fallout,
402. Donald Ayer, Commentary: High Court Review, RECORDER, August 8, 1991, at
4.
403. See 137 CONG. REC. E1956 (daily ed. May 29, 1991) (statement of Hon. Don
Edwards).
404. Renu Sehgal, Bills Aim to Guard Right to Abortion, BOSTON GLOBE, August
12, 1991, at 4. The full House passed a Labor, Health and Human Services bill that
would prohibit the use of federal funds to enforce the ban on abortion counseling and
referral. Id. Both the Senate and House defeated bills that would allow woman in the
military to have an abortion at a federally funded military hospital. Id.
405. Both sides of the issue claimed enough votes to either sustain or override a
veto. E.g., Mary Deibel, Senate Panel Defies Bush Veto Threat Votes Against Abortion
"Gag Rule", SEATTLE TIMEs, July 12, 1991, at BI; Elaine S. Povich, Senate OKs Bill
Lifting "Gag Rule", CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1991, at M5. However, there was some indica-
tion earlier that President Bush was willing to review the administration's stand on
the doctor-patient aspect of the ban on abortion counseling and referral. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Murray & Joyce Price, Bush Drops Hint of Shift Over Abortion, WASH.
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at A6. President Bush is quoted as stating. "We've got enough
contentious items out there that divide this country, and I want to see the country
come together.... But I am not going to change my fundamental position on this issue
that to me is a very moral issue." Id
406. William J. Eaton, House Sustains Bush's Abortion Counseling Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991 at Al.
407. Senator Chafee's original bill contained language that required that clinics
counsel and make referrals on all options, including abortion. This was changed to
make discussion of all options permissible. Helen Dewar, Senate Indicates Backing for
Abortion Counseling, Confusion on Parental Consent, WASH. POST, July 17, 1991 at AS.
408. See supra notes 233-252, 304-317 and accompanying text.
409. How Far Right?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1991, at 19 (comments of Democratic poll-
ster Harrison Hickman). NEWSWEEK opines that the Republican party is at risk of los-
ing its younger voters over the abortion issue. Id. at 19-20. See David Broder,
Women's Caucus Draws New Energy from an Unexpected Source, CHI. TRIB., July 18,
1991, at C27 (stating that Young Republicans at the National Women's Political Caucus
agreed with the theory that the anti-abortion stand would loose the party votes).
particularly in the Republican Party.410 Congress presented an ave-
nue for the Administration to maintain its position on abortion and
reverse its position on the new regulations.411 The administration
needed only to conclude that Congress intended the Title X ban on
abortion to encompass conduct, not speech, and gracefully exit the
quagmire.412
VI. CONCLUSION
"[Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content."4
13
On the heels of the onslaught of criticism following Rust v. Sulli-
van, President Bush remarked that "[a]s a nation we must protect
the unborn."4'4 There is little argument with this sentiment. While
the Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan is a victory in the
narrow context of protecting unborn life, it is a questionable attempt
to answer "important questions of constitutional law."415 . The diffi-
culty with the decision comes with allowing government to intrude in
the protected realm of freedom of speech under the guise of federal
funding and to change with relative ease a regulation with eighteen
years of history.
Rust v. Sullivan teaches that congressional leaders cannot success-
fully blur their intent with ambiguous language. Congressional ambi-
guity opens the door to an administrative interpretation that need
410. Republicans who are anti-abortion are "uncomfortable with the gag rule."
Elaine S. Povich, Panel Votes to Lift Abortion '"agRule", CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1991, at
C1 (comments of Rep. John Porter (R-Ill)).
California Democrat Representative Don Edwards has drafted with the assistance of
Professor Laurence Tribe a Freedom of Choice Act that provides federal guidelines on
abortion essentially along the lines of Roe v. Wade. Eileen McNamara, Abortion and
Congress; After Passage of Strict Louisiana Law, Focus Turns to a Nation Rights Bill,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1991, at Al. It is predicted that the Freedom of Choice Act
will become an issue in the 1992 election. Id
411. See Steve Holland, White House Reviewing Ban on Abortion Counseling at
Clinics, REuTERS, July 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (stating
the White House was looking at the history of Title X to determine Congressional
intent).
412. See supra notes 15-34 and accompanying text. See also Reviewing the "Gag
Rule", WASH. POST, July 10, 1991, at A20.
In a Harris poll commissioned by Planned Parenthood it was stated that seventy-
eight percent of those polled opposed the decision in Rust v. Sullivan. Faye Wattleton,
address to the National Press Club Luncheon, June 19, 1991 (transcript by Federal
News Service), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. A large majority be-
lieved the Title X restrictions on abortion counseling and referral to be "censorship of
health information... violat[ing] free speech." I&
413. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
414. Memorandum From President George Bush, August 17, 1991 (issued by the
White House Office of the Press Secretary), available in LEXIS Nexis Library, Currnt
File.
415. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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only derive from a reasoned analysis to withstand judicial review.416
Where Congress and the Administration are on different sides of an
issue, the expected results are typified by the litigation leading up to
Rust v. Sullivan, and the embittered subsequent activity.
There is a difference between government interference with a pro-
tected activity and government encouragement of an alternate activ-
ity.417 Where the latter may be constitutionally protected, the
former is not.4 18 Encroachment of First Amendment rights is an im-
proper weapon regardless of where one's sentiments lie in the abor-
tion battle.
LOYE M. BARTON
416. Id. at 1767-69.
417. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1973).
418. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Perry Court stated:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitution-
ally protected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if
the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitution-
ally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in
effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'pro-
duce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
Id. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).

